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Predicting Administrative Patent
Challenges
Talia Bar* and Brendan Costello†
Abstract
In this Article, we empirically study the use of administrative
validity challenges by defendants in patent infringement suits.
By requesting an administrative challenge, defendants can
effectively bifurcate a patent infringement suit, staying district
court proceedings while they challenge the validity of the patent
at the patent office. Because of potential advantages in cost,
speed, and legal standards, administrative challenge procedures
like inter partes review appear facially attractive to defendants
and have been heralded by scholars as a way to reduce litigation
costs and improve the patent system.
Despite all of the potential benefits, we find that district court
defendants requested an administrative challenge—inter partes
reexamination or inter partes review—of less than ten percent of
the approximately sixty thousand patents litigated between 2008
and 2015. Some of the low challenge rate can be explained by
statutory ineligibility and changes in the standard for the joinder
of multiple defendants. But much of the low challenge rate
appears driven by speedy resolutions of the underlying dispute:
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over fifty percent of the cases where defendants did not use a
challenge settled or otherwise terminated within one year.
Our results have three important implications. First, we
discover trends that can inform the design and evaluation of
administrative challenge procedures. We find substantial
evidence that the 2011 America Invents Act reform increased the
use of administrative challenges by defendants. Still, the reform
had heterogeneous, possibly unintended effects. Small entity
patents, for example, are less likely to be challenged after the AIA
than before. We also identify areas ripe for future reform. Despite
growing policy concern over patent assertion entities (PAEs), for
example, patents asserted by PAEs are currently less likely to face
an administrative challenge than other similar patents. Second,
we empirically test several predictions in a growing theoretical
literature on the interaction between Article III courts and
administrative venues. We confirm an important earlier result: a
defendant’s decision to request an administrative challenge
appears highly sensitive to the district in which the defendant is
sued. Pushing further, we also discover sensitivity to the
particular judge assigned. Third, we caution that a growing
empirical literature on the outcomes of inter partes review may
be clouded by selection bias. We find some evidence that the cases
where defendants use administrative challenges involve patents
of particularly high value compared to other litigated patents,
when the latter are not settled early. Our selection models provide
a framework for future authors to consider and account for these
selection effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, Congress has created procedures
that allow third parties to challenge the validity of a granted
patent at the patent office instead of an Article III court.1 Such
administrative patent challenges can be especially useful to
district court defendants who seek to render infringement moot
by proving that the asserted patent is invalid. By requesting an
administrative challenge and an associated stay of litigation,
defendants can effectively bifurcate the trial,2 and take
1. Congress first created inter partes reexamination (IPX) in 1999 and the
2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act replaced IPX with inter partes review
(IPR), which took effect in 2012. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999); Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2011).
2. See generally Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis
of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218
(2016) (comparing the U.K. and German systems and calling for further
research to investigate the effects of bifurcation in the U.S.).
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advantage of substantially decreased cost,3 increased speed,4
and more favorable legal standards at the patent office.5
Scholars have trumpeted the potential of administrative
challenges to “fix patent office errors”6 and yield billions of
dollars of welfare gains by invalidating bad patents and avoiding
litigation costs.7
As the number of administrative challenges requests has
increased dramatically in recent years,8 a growing body of
empirical work has emerged to analyze the use of the most
popular administrative challenge: inter partes review.9 In an
important early contribution, Professors Vishnubhakat, Rai,
and Kesan provide a high-level look at the use of inter partes
review during its first three years.10 They find that while a
3. Median civil litigation costs range from $650,000 to $2.5 million, which
is substantially greater than the estimated costs of inter partes reexamination
($128,000) or inter partes review ($487,000). Economics and Logic of Patent
Litigation Versus Post Grant/Inter Partes Patent Review, RATNERPRESTIA,
https://www.ratnerprestia.com/2012/10/03/economics-and-logic-of-patentlitigation-versus-post-grantinter-partes-patent-review/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2020) (citing the 2011 AIPLA report); IPRs: Reality Amid the Pyrotechnics, RPX
CORPORATION,
https://www.rpxcorp.com/2015/07/02/iprs-reality-amid-thepyrotechnics/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
4. See infra Part II.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge
and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943,
968–969 (2004).
7. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Separating
Patent Wheat from Chaff: Would the U.S. Benefit from Adopting a Patent PostGrant Review?, 43 RES. POL’Y 1649 (2014) (concluding that the U.S. may benefit
from adopting the post-grant review if the costs are controlled).
8. Compare U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION
HISTORICAL
STATISTICS
(Dec.
2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stat
s_roll_up.pdf (noting 168 IPX filings in fiscal year 2008), with U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
TRIAL
STATISTICS
(June
2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180630.
pdf (noting 1,117 IPR filings in fiscal year 2018).
9. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Shawn P. Miller & Shawn Ambwani,
Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence from Inter Partes Review Proceedings,
90 COLO. L. REV. 67 (2019) (looking at outcomes of inter partes review); Saurabh
Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2016)
(providing a high-level look at filings in district court and IPR for the period
from 2011 to 2015); Brian Love & Shawn Awbwani, Inter Partes Review: An
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014) (looking at
statistics of the first two years of IPR).
10. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9.
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majority of inter partes review requests are filed by district court
defendants, only a small minority of district court defendants file
such challenges.11 In this Article, we build on this foundational
work by constructing a comprehensive database of all
administrative challenges filed over a decade. We expand the
scope of the earlier study to include three more years of inter
partes review requests (through 2018) and also consider earlier
administrative
challenges—inter
partes
reexamination
requests—filed between 2008 and 2012. This allows us to
observe broad trends in administrative challenge use over time
and any changes that occurred after the passage of the American
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).12 Importantly, we also expand the
depth of the analysis to consider not just challenge filings but
also important characteristics of the district court cases that
usually precede administrative challenges. We collect data on
parties, judges, and patents in order to identify which
characteristics best predict whether a defendant will use an
administrative challenge in a given case.
Our comprehensive study into the use of administrative
challenges by district court defendants has implications in three
broad areas of policy. First, understanding how defendants
actually use administrative challenge procedures can help
inform the design, evaluation, and refinement of these
procedures. Empirical work can identify, for example, whether
cases of particular policy interest are using administrative
procedures. In particular, administrative patent review systems
could have differential effects on small entity inventors, which
may be particularly sensitive to the cost of litigation and have
been shown to be “at a significant disadvantage in protecting
their patent rights.”13 The rise of patent assertion entities
(PAEs)—firms that profit from acquiring patents and enforcing
patent rights instead of using them to make actual products—
11. See id. at 69 (finding that from 2011 to 2015, 86.7% of patents
challenged in IPR (or the more rarely used covered business method review)
were also being litigated in the federal courts, but that only “15.2% of litigated
patents were also being challenged at the PTAB”); see also id. at 46 (finding that
seventy percent of IPR petitioners follow the “standard model” where district
court defendants subsequently bring an IPR).
12. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, codified at 35
U.S.C. § 311 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped? 47 J.L. & ECON. 45
(2004) (finding that “small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in
protecting their patent rights” compared to patentees with a large portfolio of
patents).
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has generated significant concern.14 Policymakers might want to
design the system in a way that encourages defendants in suits
brought by PAEs to challenge the asserted patent.
Most concretely, Congress passed a major reform to the
administrative patent challenge system under the AIA. The AIA
replaced the system of administrative challenges that had
existed since 1999—inter partes reexamination—with an
entirely new procedure called inter partes review.15 Empirical
study of the use of these procedures could determine whether
this reform had its intended effects, or whether it altered the use
of administrative challenges in unexpected ways. Our study
informs each of these elements of policy design and evaluation:
we separate out small entity patents, PAE cases, and the periods
before and after the AIA for particular scrutiny.
Second, understanding a defendant’s choice of venue is
important in its own right. A separate literature has emerged to
consider “strategic decision making” between administrative
challenges and Article III courts.16 Some scholars and
practitioners have theorized about when litigants should request
an administrative challenge. Perhaps most notably, existing
literature has stressed the interplay between administrative
challenges and settlement negotiations, arguing that actually
filing a challenge might counterintuitively reduce a defendant’s
leverage when the parties are looking to settle.17 Scholars have
suggested that defendants behave differently when before a
particular court or presiding judge,18 and that defendants are
better off before the patent office when the patent or the prior
art “involves complex technology.”19 However, few if any of these
theories have been compared with observed behavior. In this
14. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion
Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 651 (2014) (surveying concerns
associated with PAEs).
15. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2011).
16. We borrow this phrase from one of the most important existing studies
on this topic. See generally Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9.
17. Cf. Roger Shang & Yar Chaikovsky, Inter Partes Reexamination of
Patents: An Empirical Evaluation, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2006). Note
that this suggestion is based in the IPX regime, where challenges are much
more difficult to terminate than in IPR. This is one of the reasons that IPR
might be more appealing than IPX, which we discuss further in Part II.
18. See id. at 21–22. (discussing judge and jury-dependent considerations
that a defendant might take into account in a patent action).
19. Id.
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paper, we test these hypotheses, asking how these factors are
associated with challenge rates in the real world.
Third, our Article helps to provide needed context to existing
empirical literature. While important, the growing body of
empirical work has primarily focused on observed challenges,
noting that both procedures have invalidated the vast majority
of patent claims before them,20 with only high-quality patents
managing to survive.21 To accurately understand the effects of
administrative challenge procedures, we must first understand
when and how they are used. The fact that defendants only
rarely use administrative challenges22 raises the question of
whether observed challenges are at all representative of the
broader world of patent disputes.23 Would high invalidation
rates be surprising if only the lowest quality patents were
challenged at the patent office?24 Does the observation that
certain patents fare better or worse in administrative challenges
hinge on these patents being over- or under-represented relative
to district court litigation? Questions of selection bias thus pose
a serious hurdle to the evaluation of administrative review
procedures.25 In this Article, we attempt to model these selection

20. See, e.g., Love & Ambwani, supra note 9; Shang & Chaikovsky, supra
note 17.
21. See, e.g., Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 68 (finding empirical
results that “suggest that inter partes review is, as Congress intended,
eliminating patents that appear to be of relatively low quality”).
22. See Section II infra.
23. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. L. STUD. 1 (1984) (examining the differences between cases
resolved in the settlement process and those that are litigated to a definite
verdict).
24. See Colleen Chien, Christian Helmers & Alfred Spigarelli, Inter Partes
Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
817, 844 (2018) (arguing that “any invalidation rates must be understood in
context, as the share of invalidated patents among all patents whose validity
was challenged is the result of a number of selection mechanisms, both as
imposed by the U.S. tribunal in the case of the institution decision and by the
parties, through their decisions to settle”).
25. See, e.g., Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 161 (“[W]e
nonetheless acknowledge that our findings likely reflect some degree of
selection bias . . . .”). A notable exception is Talia Bar & Brendan Costello,
Patent Validity Challenges and the America Invents Act (U.Conn. Dep’t Econ.
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 2017-21R, 2018), a companion paper to
this piece. In that work, we employ a selection model to control for selection bias
in an evaluation of IPX and IPR outcomes. That paper only deals with selection
incidentally, using a small sample of cases to mechanically control for selection
bias in a narrow window around the AIA policy change. Here, by contrast, we
substantively engage with the question of selection: presenting the legal
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effects, so that future literature on the effects of inter partes
review can understand and account for them.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part II,
we provide background information on the system of
administrative patent challenges, compare these procedures
with litigation, and survey existing literature. In Part III, we
draw upon that background to formulate several hypotheses
about the ways in which defendants use administrative
challenges. We argue that the district and judge in the
infringement case are likely to have a substantial effect on the
decision to request an administrative challenge. Further, we
expect that cases leading to administrative challenges are those
cases that are unlikely to settle early. As a corollary, we expect
cases involving PAEs to result in challenges less frequently.
Because the AIA introduced both changes that are appealing to
potential challengers, and changes that are unappealing to
potential challengers, we argue that certain cases should have
been far more impacted by the reform than others.
In Part IV, we present the methodology of our study and a
preliminary look at the rate of administrative challenge use. The
base of our dataset is sixty thousand patents litigated between
2008 and 2015. Each observation is a patent-case, meaning that
if a number of patents were asserted under one case number, we
split them into separate observations for each asserted patent.
We then match each patent-case to any inter partes
reexamination or inter partes review requests of the same
patent filed by one of the parties to litigation within eighteen
months. We find that less than ten percent of cases lead to a
challenge. A portion of this low rate can be explained by
statutory ineligibility: removing patents litigated during the
pre-AIA period that were ineligible for inter partes
reexamination by statute, we find that the rate of challenges
rises slightly among eligible cases, but still remains fewer than
one in ten. We also find that the raw statistics are misleading
due to changes in defendant joinder under the AIA, which tend
to separate what would have usually been one case into multiple
cases. Controlling for joinder changes, our best estimate of the
challenge rate rises to just eleven percent, or just over one in ten.

theories underlying selection between an Article III court and an administrative
challenge, and testing each theoretical prediction against a sample several
times larger, in order to generalize about selection patterns across a broader
era.
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Still, the rate of challenge use appears to be increasing over the
sample period.
Our data does not allow us to disaggregate the reasons why
defendants decline to file administrative challenges in nine of
every ten cases. As a theoretical matter, not every defendant will
have a colorable challenge to validity that falls within the scope
of an IPX/IPR petition; the rate of challenge within the set of
cases with reasonably strong validity challenges might be
considerably higher. Further, our data lends support for one
simple explanation for why many cases do not lead to challenges:
over half of the non-challenged cases in our sample settled or
otherwise terminated early within one year.
In Part V we consider the effect of the infringement suit
venue on the decision to request an administrative challenge.
We find significant heterogeneity across districts. Even within
the top twenty-five most common districts, challenge rates range
from about one in five to two out of every hundred. Importantly,
these differences persist even within a district, as there are
significant differences in challenge rates across particular
judges. Part of this effect could be explained by differences in
docket management, where certain judges deter challenges by
moving quickly or pushing the parties into an early settlement.
In Part VI we look deeper into the patents at-issue in cases
that result in administrative challenges. We find that both
intrinsic and acquired characteristics of the underlying patents
are important predictors of administrative challenge. In
particular, we find some support for the idea that challenged
patents are of especially high value when compared to other
litigated patents, when the latter patents remain in district
court litigation for at least a year. We find that both small entity
patents and patents asserted by PAEs are less likely to be
challenged administratively. However, both of these results can
be explained by early settlements.
Finally, in Part VII we find some empirical evidence to
support the visual observation of increased administrative
challenges since the passage of the America Invents Act.
Controlling for observed patent characteristics, we find that
patents that were litigated after September 16, 2012, when the
AIA took effect, were more likely to be challenged
administratively. This suggests that parties to litigation are
more willing to use inter partes review than they were to use
inter partes reexamination. Further, we find evidence that not
only the prevalence but also the selection of administratively
challenged patents changed in the post-AIA period.
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II. THE PROS AND CONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CHALLENGES
In this Part, we provide a background on the venues of
validity challenge in the United States, from district court, to
inter partes reexamination, and concluding with inter partes
review. We consider the benefits and drawbacks to use of each
procedure by litigants, with a particular emphasis on alleged
infringers (defendants in an infringement suit). Along the way,
we also survey the existing literature and note relevant
empirical findings. In the Appendix, we present a summary of
the information described in this Part as Table A1.
A. THE BASELINE: DISTRICT COURT
Several patent systems in the world allow third parties to
challenge the validity of granted patents as one measure aimed
at improving patent quality.26 For most of its history, the United
States was not one of them. After a patent was deemed valid and
issued in the original examination process, the role of the patent
office was largely over.27 Challenges to the validity of issued
patents were instead made in the district courts.28 Of course, the
set of patents that are litigated in district courts is likely to be
heavily selected. Earlier studies have shown that both
acquired29 and intrinsic30 characteristics of patents are
26. The most notable example is the European Patent Office (EPO). For
background and an empirical study on the use of so-called patent opposition at
the EPO, see Dietmar Harhoff & Markus Reitzig, Determinants of Opposition
Against EPO Patent Grants—The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals,
22 INT’L J.INDUS. ORG. 443 (2004).
27. One notable exception was the existence of reissue patents, where the
validity of the patent again became the subject of inquiry for the patent office,
and third parties could submit evidence of invalidity during the reissue
examination. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“A protest
was filed during prosecution of appellant’s reissue application which included
[invalidating prior art].”).
28. In the typical case we consider here, the parties seeking invalidation
are the defendants in an infringement suit. It is, of course, possible for these
parties to be the plaintiff if they begin a lawsuit for declaratory judgment.
29. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 283 (2011) (investigating factors that predict whether a particular patent
will be litigated and discovering that the important predictors of litigation
include so-called “acquired characteristics” of a patent that are realized after its
issuance, such forward citations and assignment). Note that Professor Chien’s
article inspired the title for this Article.
30. See generally Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics
of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001)
(finding that significant predictors of litigation include both intrinsic
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important in predicting litigation; these characteristics tend to
suggest that litigated patents are of broader scope and higher
value relative to all issued patents.31
When dragged into district court by a patent holder, a
defendant may counter with a common defense to infringement:
that the patent claims at-issue are invalid.32 For hundreds of
years, the judicial branch has been in the business of
invalidating patents.33 The Patent Act explicitly contemplates
this defense.34 One district court, in considering the bar for
defending on ground of invalidity, argued that “[n]o federal court
of appeals has considered how the Twombly and Iqbal decisions
apply to patent invalidity counterclaim or affirmative defense
pleadings” and that “[d]istrict courts . . . have reached
conflicting results.”35 By contrast, one study has found that most
courts typically do apply Iqbal and Twombly in cases of
counterclaims, but concedes that there is less clarity on which
standards apply to defenses.36 In any event, it appears clear that
characteristics, including claims, and acquired characteristics that describe the
patent owner); Alan C. Marco & Richard D. Miller, Patent Examination Quality
and Litigation: Is There a Link?, 26 INT’L J. OF ECON. OF BUS. 65, 87 (2019)
(finding evidence that broader patents are more likely to be involved in
litigation, identifying several examination markers that help predict litigation,
and finding that several of the “most impactful variables are defined prior to
any examination”).
31. See Marco & Miller, supra note 30, at 82, 87.
32. Of course, the defendant could also argue non-infringement, or allege a
number of other affirmative defenses created by statute or the courts. See
PETER MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 404 (2017) (noting the existence
of other court-recognized defenses such as experimental use).
33. See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co, 159 U.S. 465
(1895) (holding in an infringement suit for an electric light patent in broader
Edison-Sawyer/Mann contest that a patent by Sawyer-Mann was invalid
because its description was too broad to enable someone to create the bulb
without “painstaking experimentation”); see also B. Zorina Khan, Property
Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. ECON.
HIST. 58, 70–85 (1995) (providing a general discussion of patenting and the legal
system in the United States).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (listing “invalidity of the patent . . . on any
ground specified in part II as a condition of patentability” as one of the “defenses
in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent”).
35. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co., No. 1:10-cv-3008-AT,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135675 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011). See generally Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
36. Conrad Gosen & Tasha Francis, The Confusing and Often
Contradictory World of Pleading Defenses and Counterclaims in Patent Cases,
IPO L.J. (2015). See also Sarah E. Jack, Note, Restoring Equilibrium: Why
Twombly and Iqbal Should Apply to All Pleadings in Patent Cases, 103 IOWA L.
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the standard applied will be less than or equal to Iqbal and
Twombly.
Assuming the case has now survived a motion to dismiss,
under whatever standard the court applies, the burden now falls
on the defendant to prove invalidity.37 This burden can be
substantial, as patents challenged in the district court are
presumed valid by statute.38 Further, the standard for proof is
“clear and convincing evidence”—higher than the typical
preponderance of the evidence standard in civil litigation.39 Still,
defendants attempting to prove invalidity have ample
opportunities to do so. The set of invalidating evidence at this
stage can generally relate to any ground that would have been a
condition of patentability.40 And, as in any civil action, the
parties often engage in significant discovery, and can retain
experts to testify.
Of course, this evidence is rarely presented at trial, because
trials rarely occur. Consistent with litigation generally, the vast
majority of patent suits settle before a decision on the merits can
be reached.41 Even when a decision on the merits is reached, it
need not be at trial. Rather, the court might decide issues of
validity by summary judgement. In fact, when courts do reach a
decision on validity, they typically do so at an earlier procedural
stage than infringement.42 Still, we note that this reality does
not necessarily undermine our claims regarding cost.43 Kesan
REV. 1301 (2018) (finding that “[c]ourts only inconsistently apply plausible
pleading to counterclaims and affirmative defenses”).
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”).
38. See id. (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
39. MENELL ET AL., supra note 32.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (One defense is “invalidity of the patent . . . on
any ground specified in part II as a condition of patentability”). See also MENELL
ET AL., supra note 32, at 209 (examining assertions of invalidity by particular
grounds, including utility, obviousness, double-patenting, and inappropriate
inventorship).
41. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases
Resolved—An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of
Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259 (2006) (noting that
“approximately 80% of patent cases settle”).
42. See id. at 277 (finding that “rulings of invalidity tend to occur at an
earlier procedural stage compared with rulings of infringement”).
43. Recall that an inordinate amount of expenses are still realized even if
a case settles or ends in summary judgement immediately after discovery. See
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37
(2015)
[hereinafter
AIPLA
REPORT],
http://files.ctctcdn.com/
e79ee274201/b6ced6c3-d1ee-4ee7-9873-352dbe08d8fd.pdf (comparing median
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and Ball explicitly caution that early does not mean cheap:
“obtaining a pre-trial ruling—particularly pertaining to
invalidity—can be very expensive in patent cases.”44
All told, district courts appear to rarely invalidate patents—
only about two percent of cases result in the invalidation of one
or more patent claims.45 This is largely driven by the fact that
courts rarely adjudicate validity at all; Lemley and Allison find
that when ruling, courts hold patents valid 54 percent of the
time.46 Because the court fails to adjudicate validity in a vast
majority of cases, we might expect that many invalid patents are
left in the economy.
B. INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION
Aware of the tremendous cost of litigating a patent dispute
in the district courts, Congress has acted over the last four
decades to create a series of administrative alternatives to
determine validity.47 In 1999, the American Inventors Protection
Act (AIPA) created inter partes reexamination (IPX), an
administrative proceeding that could be used to adjudicate
validity.48 Compared to existing ex parte reexamination, this
new procedure allowed more participation by the requesting
party.49 While the AIPA created IPX to run alongside the ex
patent infringement litigation costs through mediation, discovery, and all
costs).
44. Id.
45. Kesan & Ball, supra note 41, at 275 (citing data from cases in 1995,
1997, and 2000).
46. Mark A. Lemley & John R. Allison, Empirical Evidence on the Validity
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
47. In 1980, Congress created ex parte reexamination to allow parties to
challenge the validity of a patent in a “relatively inexpensive” way. See Farrell
& Merges, supra note 6, at 965 (citing congressional transcripts to show that
Congress was apprised of high-cost district court litigation and its intention was
for reexamination to be a “relatively inexpensive” alternative to adjudicate
patent validity). In 1999, this initial procedure was supplemented by the
creation of inter partes reexamination (IPX). Id.
48. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2601 (9th ed., rev. Jan. 2018) (“The
reexamination statute was amended on November 29, 1999 by the American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (the AIPA), Public Law 106-113. The AIPA
expanded reexamination by providing an ‘inter partes’ option; it authorized the
extension of reexamination proceedings via an optional inter partes
reexamination procedure in addition to the existing ex parte reexamination
procedure.”).
49. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, MPEP § 2609 (8th ed.,
rev. Aug. 2012) (“[A] third party requester may participate throughout the
proceeding . . . .”).
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parte system, their relative features made it likely that IPX will
be the preferred mechanism for third parties, while ex parte
requests would be used predominantly by patent owners
themselves seeking to test their patents.50
A party who wished to institute an IPX must first overcome
the threshold question of whether they raised a “substantial new
question of patentability.”51 IPX was denied rarely, only about
ten percent of the time.52 Further, IPX petitioners could not raise
the full range of grounds for invalidity and supporting evidence.
They must only rely on documentary prior art to question
novelty and nonobviousness.53 Professor Janis notes that this
restriction practically guaranteed that IPX would “never serve
as a fully effective alternative to validity litigation,” because it
excludes invalidity theories like on sale and public use.54
Once an IPX was instituted, it proceeded before patent
examiners, similar to the original prosecution, with third parties
having a right to participate via written comments.55 The patent
office at this stage considered the validity of the granted claims.
Once started, this train was difficult to stop. Parties were not
formally able to settle an IPX midway through—once instituted,
IPX challenges continued to completion.56 Of course, third
50. See Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481, 484 (2000) (“Nevertheless, it seems
likely that the ex parte provisions will become almost exclusively the domain of
patent owner-initiated reexaminations, and the inter partes provisions will
become almost exclusively the domain of third-party initiated
reexaminations.”).
51. See MPEP § 2616 (“Under 35 U.S.C. 312 and 313, the Office must
determine whether ‘a substantial new question of patentability’ affecting any
claim of the patent has been raised.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1999)
(providing the statutory requirements for petition).
52. See Bar & Costello, supra note 25, at 13 (finding IPX denials to be about
8 percent of all IPX outcomes in a window of time pre-AIA, and 13 percent of all
outcomes in the last year of IPX before the switch to IPR).
53. See MPEP § 2609 (“Prior art considered during reexamination is
limited to prior patents or printed publications applied under the appropriate
parts of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 103 . . . .”); see also MPEP § 2660 (“In rejecting
claims for want of novelty or for obviousness, the examiner must cite the best
references at his or her command.”). Note, § 102 refers to novelty and § 103
refers to obviousness.
54. Janis, supra note 50, at 487.
55. Id. at 490; See also MPEP § 2609 (“[A] third party requester may
participate throughout the proceeding . . . .”).
56. See Shang & Chaikovsky, supra note 17 (“Once a reexamination
request is filed, the challenger cannot revoke it, and the PTO will
examine the patent to the finish regardless of settlement status. Therefore, once
the request is filed, the challenger’s promise to stop participating in
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parties could settle and then withdraw from participation,
reducing the IPX to effectively a limited ex parte request.57 Our
related research on the outcomes of patent challenges indicates
that over two-thirds of eventual IPX outcomes include at least
some claims cancellations.58 Our related research also indicates
that about a quarter include at least some claims confirmations,
and another quarter include some form of amendment or added
claims.59
All told, the IPX procedure was relatively cheap in terms of
pecuniary cost,60 but could still be very costly in terms of time.
The median pendency of an IPX from filing to a final
reexamination certificate is over three years.61 Still, this
measure is probably biased upwards somewhat due to the fact
that the certificates are only issued after any appeals. Parties
could appeal an IPX decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, and patent owners could appeal further to the
Federal Circuit.62
While IPX could be used as a standalone procedure for
parties to adjudicate the validity of a patent, its potential for use
alongside litigation was quickly realized. The AIPA includes a
provision that states that district courts “may” obtain a stay
“unless the court before which such litigation is pending
determines that a stay would not serve the interests of justice.”63
Professor Janis has noted that this provision appears
unnecessary, as courts already had inherent authority to stay
litigation in such cases.64 In any event, this provision at least
reexamination will have no settlement value for ex parte proceedings, and
limited value for inter partes proceedings.”). But see Scott McKeown, Settlement
Agreements and Patent Reexamination, ROPES & GRAY: PATENTS POST-GRANT
(Jan. 5, 2012) https://www.patentspostgrant.com/settlement-agreementspatent-reexamination/ (arguing that in theory settling parties may be able to
stop an IPX by obtaining a consent order in district court that could trigger IPX
estoppel, but conceding that “[i]n practice, defendants rarely agree to such a
consent order . . . ”).
57. See id. (“Without the challenger, the inter partes proceeding effectively
resembles an ex parte proceeding . . . .”).
58. Bar & Costello, supra note 25, at 38.
59. Id.
60. See RATNERPRESTIA, supra note 3.
61. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Inter Partes Reexamination Filing
Data
(Sept.
30,
2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stat
s_roll_up.pdf.
62. MPEP supra note 48.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 318 (1999); Janis supra note 50, at 497.
64. Janis, supra note 50 at 498.
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confirms the possibility of bifurcated trials: where pending
infringement suits are stayed to adjudicate validity at the patent
office before returning to the district court to determine
infringement. Gardella and Berger discuss the use of
reexamination as a strategic tool by alleged infringers to stay
pending litigation.65 They predict that success in the
reexamination system will cause patent holders to file narrower
patents that are less likely to be invalidated in these
proceedings.66
Of course, adjudicating validity at the patent office would be
less meaningful if the parties could then return to the district
court and have a second bite at the apple. To prevent this,
Congress attached an estoppel provision meant to prevent
challengers from “re-litigating a validity issue in court following
an unsuccessful effort to invalidate through reexamination,” or
vice versa.67 Rightfully, this estoppel exempts challenge grounds
that were outside of IPX’s scope by limiting it to arguments the
requestor “raised or could have raised during the inter partes
proceedings.”68 Still, Professor Janis categorizes the language of
the estoppel provisions as overly broad, noting that “the estoppel
provisions alone may convince many patent owners to avoid
inter partes reexamination.”69
Published USPTO statistics indicate that IPX was initially
slow to be used, but its use steadily grew.70 Only twenty-six inter
partes reexaminations were filed in its first four years.71 The
next four years saw a still low 282 filings.72 At least part of IPX’s
slow start can be explained by statutory restrictions on its use.
Parties are only able to request IPX on patents filed on or after

65. See generally Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States
Reexamination Procedures: Recent Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent
Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 381 (2009) (“Some are filing
more reexamination requests in an effort to circumvent the high cost of United
States patent litigation; this strategy is enabled by the willingness of many
districts courts to postpone litigation while the reexamination is pending.”).
66. Id. at 382.
67. Janis supra note 50, at 492.
68. Id. (emphasis omitted).
69. Id.
70. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 61 (showing that one
inter partes reexamination was filed in 2001 and 530 were filed in 2012 with an
increase every year).
71. See id. (showing zero filed in 2000, one filed in 2001, four filed in 2002,
and twenty-one filed in 2003).
72. Id.
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November 29, 1999.73 Therefore, for the first few years of IPX,
the set of eligible patents was quite small. Filings appeared to
be on an upward climb before IPX was discontinued in 2012 by
the AIA. There were 1,081 IPX filings between 2008 and 2011,
and 530 in 2012 alone.74
C. INTER PARTES REVIEW
In 2011, Congress took another shot at reforming
administrative challenge procedures with the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act.75 First, the AIA changed the standard for
granting a request for reexamination, raising the bar from a
“substantial new question of patentability” to “a reasonable
likelihood that the requester will prevail with respect to at least
one claim,”76 which is expected to increase the rate of
reexamination denials.77 This standard took effect for the final
year of IPX and remains in effect for IPR.78
Most notably for our purposes, the AIA discontinued IPX
effective September 16, 2012.79 In its place, the AIA created a
tripartite system of inter partes review, post-grant review, and

73. MPEP § 2609 (“Any third party requester can request inter partes
reexamination at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent (for
a patent issued from an original application filed on or after November 29,
1999) . . . .”).
74. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 61.
75. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011). Note that
this law also had many other effects besides those recounted for administrative
challenge systems, such as changing to a first-to-file regime.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize an inter partes
review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information
presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under
section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”).
77. See, e.g., Matthew Phillips & Kevin Laurence, Changes to
Reexamination Under the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Nov.,
2011),
https://www.stoel.com/StoelRives/files/93/9383d92d-ed13-4b0f-8c334a38039fcf2f.pdf.
78. Id.
79. MPEP § 2601 (“The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the
AIA) . . . was enacted September 16, 2011. Section 6(c) of the AIA replaced the
inter partes reexamination process, effective September 16, 2012, with a new
inter partes review process, such that on or after September 16, 2012 the Office
no longer entertains requests for inter partes reexamination but instead accepts
petitions to conduct inter partes review.”).
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covered business method patent review.80 For this study, we
focus on IPR, as the primary successor to IPX.81
Compared to IPX, IPR appears closer to litigation and
farther from original patent prosecution. Unlike IPX, IPR allows
for the deposition of witnesses and other associated discovery, as
well as an oral hearing with administrative patent judges.82
Stahl and Heckenberg explain that “[t]he new review
proceedings may also be more enticing to a patent challenger
since they make available to the accused infringer more
procedures analogous to those available in patent litigation.”83
Most notably, the AIA has mandated that IPR proceed
expediently, with an expected overall timing of eighteen months,
half the time expected of IPX.84 Additionally, in IPX only patents
filed after November 29, 1999, could be reexamined while in IPR
this restriction was lifted, expanding the set of patents that can
be challenged.85 Finally, parties can seek to settle their dispute
and formally end the IPR process.86
However, not all changes are beneficial to the requestor.
Challenges under the AIA have become substantially more
expensive.87 Furthermore, the estoppel described above has
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 311–319 (outlining inter partes review); American
Invents Act § 18 (outlining covered business methods).
81. The vast majority of cases in our later-constructed sample are filed
more than nine months after the patent’s issuance, and are thus ineligible for
PGR. In some of our analysis, we match on patent class, which should somewhat
obviate the possibility of CBM within our non-challenged group.
82. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, STERN KESSLER GOLDSTEIN FOX,
https://web.archive.org/web/20140402045337/http://ptolitigationcenter.com/wp
-content/uploads/2009/08/ipx-v-ipr.pdf. (outlining the differences between
hearing characteristics in IPX and IPR).
83. Lawrence A. Stahl & Donald H. Heckenberg, The Scope and
Ramifications of the New Post-Grant and Inter Partes Review Proceedings at the
USPTO 6 (2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/e4bd1e8a
-651e-40e2-9f7d-f45e80b9deab.pdf D (last visited May 2, 2020).
84. IPR is given statutory time restrictions: six months to reach an
institution decision (grant or deny), split into a three-month period for patent
owner response (37 C.F.R. § 42.107) followed by another three-month period for
USPTO decision (35 U.S.C. § 314). Then another twelve months to reach a final
determination (cancel, confirm, etc.) (35 U.S.C. § 316). Limited six-month
extensions can be granted “for good cause shown.” Thus, we would expect most
IPRs to reach a final decision within eighteen months, or 1.5 years.
85. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82, at 1 (stating the
differences between reexamination criteria in IPX and IPR).
86. Id.; see also Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry
Settlements at the Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30 (2018) (examining
IPR settlements).
87. See RATNERPRESTIA, supra note 3.
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become more restrictive under IPR. Estoppel now binds earlier
(before appeals), and restricts both district court and future PTO
actions.88
Perhaps even more so than IPX, Congress appears to have
contemplated IPR as a way to bifurcate litigation. The AIA
prohibits parties from filing an IPR if they were served with an
infringement complaint more than one year ago.89 This
incentivizes parties to avoid redundancy between the district
court and the patent office by requiring them to quickly file an
IPR before the district court proceedings has moved too far
along.
In one early empirical contribution, Professors Chien and
Helmers trace the path of a typical inter partes review.90 They
note, importantly, that the headline number of invalidations in
IPR must be understood “in context,” as many challenged claims
are denied review before reaching a final decision.91 In another
recent contribution, Professors Vishnubhakat, Rai, and Kesan
provide an important study on the strategic use of IPR by parties
in litigation.92 They find that the majority (seventy percent) of
inter partes review validity challenges are brought by district
court defendants.93 They also note that the Eastern District of
Texas has a reluctance to grant stays, but that parties from there
(as well as the District of Delaware and Northern District of
California) see a disproportionate number of IPR petitions.94 In
our study, we attempt to expand on this foundational work in
three ways: (i) by focusing explicitly not just on the court cases
that led to IPR, but also those that chose not to use it, (ii) by
using patent characteristics to predict which cases will use IPR,
and (iii) by including not just IPR filings but IPX filings which
allows us to examine whether the AIA policy change affected the
use of administrative proceedings to challenge patent validity.
Finally, we note as a measure of stakes that the IPR process
has already generated significant controversy. Its very
constitutionality was questioned before the Supreme Court,

88. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82, at 2 (outlining the
differences between estoppel in IPX and IPR).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
90. See generally Chien, Helmers & Spigarelli, supra note 24.
91. Id. at 844. This important insight, however, has no bearing at this
study, as we look at the filing of an IPR and not its final conclusion.
92. See generally Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9.
93. Id. at 49.
94. Id. at 80.
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though it eventually survived.95 Likewise, it has been criticized
on policy grounds, having been referred to as a patent “death
squad,” accused of having anti-patent slant and harming
innovators.96 Still, our early research investigating the effect of
the policy change has found no evidence that the policy change
introduced a negative bias against the patentee in
reexamination.97 Controversy aside, IPR seems to be becoming
increasingly popular. IPR surpassed three thousand requests in
its first three years—over one thosuand requests more than IPX
in its entire thirteen-year tenure.98
III. SELECTION HYPOTHESES: WHO MIGHT PREFER
WHAT?
In the last Part, we have shown that litigation, IPX, and IPR
differ in important respects. Here, we summarize the key
differences and hypothesize why parties in certain cases may or
may not choose to use administrative review.
First, we expect that the rates of administrative challenge
will vary considerably by district. Other work has shown that
there is significant evidence of “court shopping” going on in
patent cases.99 If plaintiffs select into districts depending on
their litigation strategies, plaintiffs that select into a particular
district may litigate in particular ways that would push
defendants toward or away from using an administrative
challenge. Of course, particular tendencies of the courts might
also have an effect on defendants’ willingness to request an
administrative challenge. Districts that are especially hostile to
stay requests or especially proficient in patent litigation, for
95. See Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1369 (2018) (holding that inter partes review does not violate article
III of the U.S. Constitution).
96. See, e.g., Brian Mahoney, Software Patent Ruling a Major Judicial
Failure,
Rader
Says,
LAW360
(Oct.
25,
2013),
https://www.law360.com/articles/482264 (quoting Chief Judge Rader, who used
the “death squad” language in a speech). See also Paul Morinville, How the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board Harms Inventors, IPWATCHDOG, (Sept. 13,
2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/13/how-the-patent-trial-andappeal-board-harms-inventors/id=72554/ (presenting comments describing this
view of the PTAB).
97. See Bar & Costello, supra note 25.
98. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD
STATISTICS
(Sept.
30,
2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30%20PTAB.pdf.
99. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 631 (2015).
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example, might deter use of an administrative challenge.100 This
latter effect might also persist with respect to individual judges.
Even within a certain court, a particular judge might have a
penchant for speedy docket management, or an aversion to
granting stays.101 We test for differential effects of courts and
judges in Part V.
Of course, while particular districts and judges can provide
constraints on case management, there is still room for
substantial heterogeneity in litigating strategies. Certain
classes of plaintiffs might be able to deter administrative
challenges. Put another way, defendants might be more or less
willing to use an administrative challenge depending on the type
of party accusing them of infringement. One obvious factor is the
desire of parties to reach quick settlements. Cases that settle
quickly do not meaningfully challenge validity in any venue.
And, on the other side of the coin, parties that intend to settle
quickly might not actually request an administrative challenge,
preferring instead to hold it in front of the plaintiff’s nose as
leverage.102 Therefore, we might expect that a substantial
portion of our non-challenged cases were those that simply
settled quickly. We test this finding in Section IV.D.
A corollary is that we might expect plaintiffs who wish to
settle early to deter the filing of an administrative challenge.
PAEs immediately come to mind, as they have been theorized in
other work to potentially have “a greater willingness . . . to settle
litigation.”103 The same might be true of small entity patents,
but for a different reason. Small entity patentees are those who
qualified for reduced filing fees at the time of examination, and
thus might be uniquely unable to bear the costs of litigation.
They might also, therefore, seek early settlement, and the
litigation might cease prior to the filing of an administrative
challenge by defendants. Of course, this presumes that the
plaintiff asserting the patent was the original patentee—in
Section VI we test for the small entity and PAE effects alongside
an indicator for patent re-assignment prior to litigation.
There is also good reason to expect that characteristics of
the patent at-issue might affect the decision to challenge the
patent’s validity in district court versus at the patent office. One
100. See Shang & Chaikovsky, supra note 17, at 23–24.
101. Id at 23.
102. Id at 26.
103. Mazzeo et al., Do NPEs Matter? Non-Practicing Entities and Patent
Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON 879, 881 (2013).
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paper suggests that the patent office would be preferred when
the patent or the relevant prior art “involves complex
technology.”104 While certain inventions in any technology area
can, of course, be very complex, or very simple, this advice would
tend to suggest differences across technology categories in the
rate of administrative challenge use. A defendant might find it
easier to explain, for example, a mechanical invention to a
generalist judge or lay jury rather than a complex algorithm. By
contrast, areas that might fit particularly well to jury
nullification—such as invalidating the patent for an expensive
drug—might seem more favorable to challenge in the district
court. In Section VI, we test for differential challenge rates
across patent technology categories.
As we have seen, there are several benefits and drawbacks
to IPR as compared with IPX. In particular, IPR is more
advantageous to parties sensitive to the cost of time, but less
preferred by parties particularly sensitive to pecuniary costs.
Clearly, the bar for instituting an administrative challenge is
higher than the low bar for alleging invalidity in the district
court; this difference is even more pronounced post-AIA. Parties
who seek to challenge validity simply to leverage a settlement,
without strong grounds of actual invalidity, may prefer to
remain in district court, rather than apply for IPX/IPR and get
denied. Further, parties who expect to settle may have been
unlikely to request IPX, as it restricted the ability of settlement
to end the dispute. This concern is limited in IPR, which allows
settlements. All else equal, we would expect this shift to increase
the number of parties requesting IPR compared with IPX.
Clearly, though, one takeaway is that IPR is not universally
beneficial to all defendants relative to IPX. Parties may be
especially sensitive to one of its beneficial or detrimental
provisions. Therefore, we might expect to see highly
heterogeneous effects of the AIA, with certain parties and types
of cases more quickly flocking to IPR than others.
IV. HOW MANY CASES RESULT IN CHALLENGES?
A. METHODOLOGY
The base of our dataset is patent litigation filings. We
collected data on litigation from DocketNavigator,105 searching

104. See Shang & Chaikovsky, supra note 17, at 22.
105. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://docketnavigator.com.
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for all U.S. district court cases that involve a complaint for
infringement.106 DocketNavigator compiles data on every
electronically available patent complaint dating back to 2008. 107
Our dataset therefore starts with cases filed on January 1, 2008;
we extend the analysis through December 31, 2015.108 Our unit
of analysis is patent-case, meaning that each observation is one
case filed in district court for a unique patent. Put another way,
each observation in our database is a single litigated patent. If
the same patent is subject to two different lawsuits, we will have
two observations in our dataset. Likewise, if one lawsuit involves
multiple patents, we will have a separate observation for each
patent involved in the suit.109 Our analysis focuses on utility
patents.110

106. Specifically, we searched for all cases that contained document types
“complaint–infringement” “complaint–infringement–ANDA” or “complaint–
infringement–BPCIA.” Of course, the patents involved in any particular case
were not necessarily raised in the original infringement complaint. They may
have been brought up, for example, in a counterclaim for infringement. But, we
expect such cases to be somewhat uncommon, and further when they are
present, they should fit well into our mold. They themselves are patent
assertions, and would be separated out into separate patent-case observations,
to be matched with any IPX or IPR that is filed by a litigation party (in this
case, the original plaintiff).
107. PATENT
LIBRARY
SCOPE
OF
DATA,
https://compass.docketnavigator.com/help/scope.html
(explaining
how
DocketNavigator has some data all the way back to 2000, but we use variables
for which they only have comprehensive data from 2008 onwards).
108. Technically, DocketNavigator has cases much more recent than 2015,
but our end date was set by two constraints. First, as detailed later, we needed
to stop collection of litigation cases at some point earlier than our IPR end date
to avoid truncation. That is, we wanted every litigation case in our sample to
have sufficient time to observe whether an IPR was filed. Second, the dataset
on patent assertion entities—a core part of our analysis—only spans through
2015, meaning we would have dropped any litigation cases past 2015 in our
eventual analysis anyway.
109. When splitting a single case into multiple observations for every patent
at issue, our dataset imputes the date of the initial complaint on each patent.
Because patents may be added to one case at different times, this date might
not be representative of the actual date that each particular patent was asserted
in litigation. We noticed that in a few percent of our cases, the attributed
litigation date was earlier than the issue date of the patent. Looking at a sample
of docket sheets, this tended to happen when a patent was under review when
the litigation was filed, but added to the litigation shortly after it was issued.
We correct for this by replacing the case “filing date” with the issue date of the
patent whenever the issue date is later than the case filing date.
110. We drop patents with “D” or “P” in the name, to focus on utility patents.
As a practical matter, many of these patents would be excluded from our later
analysis in any case due to a lack of covariates that cover these patents in the
datasets that we use.
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Next, we construct a dataset of administrative patent
challenges. For the purposes of this study, we focus only on inter
partes reexamination and inter partes review. IPX filings are
identified via the PatEx database,111 where they are coded as
children in the “Continuity Data” dataset, with the prefix “95.”
This source gives us the filing date of each IPX and its associated
patent. We collected data on IPRs from DocketNavigator, in a
similar method to that used by Vishnubhakat et al.112 This
provides us with the patent number and filing date for each IPR
challenge.113 Our available data spans all IPX and IPR
challenges filed between January 1, 2008 and December 31,
2018.
The core question we seek to answer is which litigation cases
led to the filing of an IPX or IPR challenge, and which did not.
Therefore, for each district court patent-case we look to see if we
can match it with an IPX or IPR involving the same parties. This
matching process may not always be one-to-one. A single district
court case may well lead to several administrative challenges—
perhaps each defendant files her own challenge, or one
defendant files multiple challenges.114 On the other hand,
defendants in multiple cases might band together to file one
IPR.115 To handle this complexity, we first generate each
pairwise match of district court and IPX/IPR based on the patent
at issue. For example, imagine patent A was litigated three
times—cases 1, 2, and 3—and was challenged twice, once each
in IPX and IPR. Our pairwise matching would first generate six
“potential matches”: case1–IPX, case1–IPR, case2–IPX, case2–
IPR, case3–IPX, and case3–IPR. Therefore, we identify every

111. PatEx is a comprehensive database with a range of bibliographic data
on public patents. Public patents are those released in Public PAIR, a subset of
the private PALM. This is a dataset of over nine million patents, through
December 2014. See Stuart J.H. Graham, et al., The USPTO Patent
Examination Research Dataset: A Window on Patent Processing, 27 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 554 (2018).
112. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 59–60 (discussing
inter partes review). We further collapse any IPR filings that were filed on the
same date, requesting the review of the same patent, and filed by the same
party to one observation. This eliminates double counting of any challenges that
were split up into separate filings, for example, to skirt the page limit.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 47 (noting that “multiple petitions against a patent may be
filed by the same or different parties”).
115. See id. (noting that “a single petition may be filed or joined by multiple
parties”).

2020]

ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT CHALLENGES

231

possible match combination of district court cases and
administrative challenges.
Of course, not every possible combination is a true match
that we care about. Instead, we want to limit to the case where
one party asserts a patent in district court, and a defending
party then challenges the patent in IPX or IPR. As a preliminary
matter, we drop any possible matches where the administrative
challenge in question was filed prior to the matched district
court case.116 Next, we compare the parties in each case directly.
For IPX, data on challengers are not electrically available.
Instead, we examine over 1000 potential matches by hand,
reading the IPX docket to identify the challengers. IPR parties,
by contrast, are electronically available in the DocketNavigator
data, so we can make use of electronic matching.117 In either
case, we code a match whenever at least one of the parties
requesting an administrative challenge is also a party to the
district court litigation.
Figure 1 plots the lag (in days) between the filing date of the
district court case118 and the filing date of the administrative
challenge for cases with matched parties.119 Unsurprisingly, we
see large spikes in the days leading up to 365, or one year. IPR
challenges, by statute, must be filed within one year of a party
being sued in district court. Still, approximately fifty percent of
116. While it is possible that sometimes in one unique dispute the IPX or
IPR could come first—by an alleged infringer anticipating or prompting a later
infringement suit, Vishnubhakat et al. suggest that such cases are rare. See
Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 76. More often, cases where the
administrative challenge precedes the litigation case are likely to simply be
false positive matches—unrelated cases.
117. We use exact matches, under the theory that party names are
consistently written in the DocketNavigator database, which is also the source
of our litigation data. To test this, we also perform a “fuzzy match” by
identifying a subset of cases that have partial character matches, and then
matching those by hand. In our test, we identify an extremely small false
negative match rate—around two percent—so we use the exact matching for
the whole set.
118. We make one small modification to the case filing date when we move
from case to patent-case observations. The case filing date is constant for each
patent within a case number, even though patents might be added to the case
at varying times. In the unlikely case where a case was filed prior to the
issuance of the patent, we know that the patent was not actually asserted in
district court until after it was issue, so we recode the effective case filing date
to be the patent issue date.
119. A small number (about ten percent) of matches had extremely high
lags—over one thousand days. We omitted these observations from the
histogram to get a better view of the shape of most of the distribution—but we
discuss those observations with high lags in the following sentences.
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our matches have a lag greater than 365 days. As Vishnubhakat
et al. note, some of this is likely due to parties requesting IPR
later than one year by virtue of latching on to an earlier case. 120
In our dataset, though, most of this is likely due to IPX matches,
which have no such one-year restriction. Still, nearly ninety
percent of our matches had lags of eighteen months or fewer.
Figure 1: Lag Between District Court and IPX/IPR Filing for
Cases with Matched Parties

At some point, of course, lags become so high that it is hard
to consider the litigation case and the administrative challenge
as part of the same dispute, even if they involve the same
parties. Parties may litigate one case to completion, and then
years later may request an administrative challenge as part of
another case, or in the absence of a case. In one extreme case, we
found that parties to litigation requested an administrative
challenge nearly ten years after the litigation complaint was
filed. To increase our confidence that the administrative
challenge is part of the same dispute, we restrict to matches with
lags equal to or less than eighteen months, which allowed us to

120. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 78 (noting that
“challenges filed more than one year after the last federal court lawsuit . . . are
likely to reflect either non-standard petitioners and/or petitioners seeking
joinder to earlier petitions”).
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retain eighty-seven percent of our matches as occurring within
the same dispute.
Next, we merge our identified matches back with our
broader litigation sample.121 As constructed, there are 63,006
patent-case observations in our dataset. In total, 7.5 percent of
district court patent-cases actually led to an administrative
challenge filing. Figure 2 plots the frequency of cases in our
sample over time. Overlaid on this chart is the frequency of cases
where we determined that an administrative challenge was filed
by the parties (a confirmed match). The vertical line indicates
the date of the AIA policy change: the switch from IPX to IPR.
Figure 2: Litigation Filings With and Without an
Administrative Challenge over Time

The number of litigation cases increased dramatically in our
sample period. The shape of administrative challenge curve
appears to loosely follow the litigation curve. The fraction of
cases where an administrative challenge is used over the entire
period is about eight percent. We are interested to see whether
this fraction is about even over the period or changes over time.
Table 1 breaks down the rate of administrative challenge by

121. Recall, some litigation cases may have led to more than one confirmed
IPX or IPR match. Because we care about litigation level data for this study, we
collapse these to a binary indicator of whether or not the case led to at least one
administrative challenge.

234

[Vol. 21:1

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

year. We test the difference between the fraction of challenges
each year, and the fraction in 2008.
Table 1: Rate of Administrative Challenge by Year
Year
Percent of Cases with an
Total Cases
Administrative Challenge
2008
3.09%
4,016
2009

3.43%

4,174

2010

3.30%

5,308

2011

3.82% **

6,889

2012

4.00% ***

11,194

2013

9.58% ***

11,718

2014

12.81% ***

9,688

2015

12.02% ***

10,019

7.49%

63,006

2008–2015

*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from
2008
at
10%,
5%,
and
1%
respectively.
The rate of administrative challenge remains between three
and four percent of cases between 2008 and 2012, but then more
than doubles in 2013. The stars in Table 1 indicate statistical
significance of tests of proportion equality between 2008 and
each subsequent year. While no significant differences are
observed for 2009 or 2010; each year following that date: 2011,
2012 (the IPR transition year) and each IPR year is significantly
different from 2008.122 Indeed, at least facially, the use of
administrative challenges seems to have increased dramatically
in recent years. Still, we hesitate to tell any sort of causal story
based solely on this graph. These results could be driven by
changes in other determinants of administrative challenge—
that is, the types of patents litigated after 2012 could be

122. The difference in the IPR transition year might be driven by increased
challenges in IPR, but in fact there were few IPR challenges in 2012. In fact,
the rate of IPX appears to have increased in this year, perhaps because parties
were aware of the switch from IPX to IPR, and some desired to request IPX
before the policy change.
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somehow systematically different from those litigated before. We
attempt to separate theses underlying characteristics from the
AIA regime switch using multivariate regression in Part VII,
infra.
B. CASES WHERE CHALLENGES ARE UNAVAILABLE BY STATUTE
Because we care about the choice to use post-grant
administrative challenges, we also separate out cases where an
administrative challenge was legally unavailable. During the
IPX regime, patents that were filed before November 29, 1999,
could not be challenged.123 These patents could, however, be
challenged in the newer IPR regime.124 Therefore, we isolate
cases where a lawsuit was filed before the IPR regime
(September 16, 2012)125 and the patent at-issue was filed before
November 29, 1999. In these cases, at the time that the
defendant was hauled into court, she was not able to request an
administrative challenge.126 Over seventeen percent of cases in
our sample meet these criteria. That means that in nearly onefifth of cases where patent defendants did not request an
administrative challenge, they were statutorily ineligible to do so.
Table 2 presents a revised yearly challenge rate restricting
only to eligible cases. When considering only cases that were
eligible for an administrative challenge, the use of
administrative challenges appears slightly larger: 9.4 percent of
eligible cases involved an administrative challenge.127 Still, the
general trend remains: the fraction of eligible cases with an
administrative challenges nearly doubles between 2008 and

123. See MPEP § 2601, supra note 48.
124. See IPX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82.
125. See MPEP § 2601 supra note 48.
126. Of course, there is a nuance here: If a party was sued between
September 16, 2011 and September 15, 2012, the party would not have been
eligible for any existing administrative challenge at the time of the complaint,
but would have become eligible for IPR within the one-year time bar once IPR
became effective. For purposes of statutory ineligibility, we focus on the fact
that at the time the case was filed, administrative challenges were not an option
for the defendants. Without having the challenge tool at its disposal at the start
of the lawsuit, a party might start down a different path that makes it irrelevant
if that tool appears later on. Further, we observe that IPR was barely used at
all in its first few months of operation, suggesting that litigants actually in this
position did not flock to IPR in large numbers immediately after it popped up.
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 98, at 13. We discuss the
possible implications of this nuance on any interpretation of an AIA effect more
generally in Section VII.A.
127. See Table 2 infra.
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2015.128 For the remainder of this analysis, we restrict to only
cases where defendants were statutorily eligible to request an
administrative challenge at the time of the case filing.
Table 2: Rate of Administrative Challenge by Year for Eligible
Cases
Year
Percent of Eligible
Total Eligible
Cases with an
Cases
Administrative
Challenge
2008
6.39%
1,941
2009

6.34%

2,254

2010

5.45%

3,213

2011

6.17%

4,263

2012

5.18% **

8,651

2013

9.58% ***

11,718

2014

12.81% ***

9,688

2015

12.02% ***

10,019

2008 –2015

9.12%

51,747

*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from
2008 at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
C. THE SKEW FROM DEFENDANT JOINDER
When looking at “case-level” data, one other wrinkle bears
noting. The patent-case observations are defined as a unique
patent litigated in a unique case number. That is, if a patent is
simultaneously litigated against five defendants under one case
number, it is treated as one observation. On the other hand, if
that same patent is simultaneously litigated against those same
five defendants—but under five different case numbers—it will
be treated as five observations. This technical change can yield
128. Interestingly, the rate of administrative challenges was actually
slightly lower in 2012 than 2008. One possible contributing factor is that once
the IPR effective date (September 16, 2012) was hit, the denominator—the
number of eligible litigation cases—likely increased due to the removal of the
statutory restriction.
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very different case numbers and challenge rates for situations
that are actually quite similar. If one defendant in the first
example requests an IPR, then the challenge rate is 1/1, or 100
percent. If the same defendant requests a challenge in the
second situation, the challenge rate is only one-fifth, or twenty
percent. This difference is particularly pronounced given one
change in the America Invents Act. Section 299 of the Act
requires a higher standard to join multiple defendants in one
case than that they are simply accused of infringing the same
patent.129 This raises the bar from the earlier, often loosely
interpreted, standard for joining defendants under Rule 20 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.130 The expected effect, of
course, is more case numbers after the AIA.
The challenge behavior of co-defendants may well affect the
behavior of a particular defendant. That is, if another defendant
in a swatch of simultaneous infringement actions decides to
request an IPR, you may benefit from their challenge, and decide
not to request your own. There are positive externalities to
administrative challenges for co-defendants—if one defendant
manages to invalidate a patent at the PTO, it is invalid and thus
unenforceable against all defendants. In the pre-AIA system,
defendants tended to be clumped together under one case
number, while post-AIA each defendant more likely appears
under a separate case number. Therefore, to compare challenge
rates more meaningfully, we ask whether at least one defendant
in the case requested a challenge.
In Table 3, we attempt to control for this change by
collapsing together cases with simultaneous defendants.131 That
is, any cases where the same patent is asserted on the same day
and in the same court are treated as one case. In the earlier
example, this means that the patent asserted simultaneously
against five defendants would count as one case, regardless of
129. See Multi-Defendant Joinder Under the America Invents Act: Much Ado
About
Nothing?,
JDSUPRA
(Dec.
20,
2012),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/multi-defendant-joinder-under-the-americ97136/ (“Section 299 permits joinder only where the claims against the
defendants arise out of ‘the same transaction . . . .’”).
130. See id. (“Prior to passage of the AIA, district courts typically applied
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine when permissive
joinder was appropriate in a patent infringement suit.”). For the importance of
considering and accounting for joinder on analyses of patent litigation that may
be affected by the AIA change, and support for the proposition that this change
lead to increased numbers of cases as defendants were sued separately, see
Cotropia et. al., supra note 14.
131. See Table 3, infra.
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whether each defendant was assigned her own case number.
Administrative challenge by any of the five defendants would
yield a 100 percent challenge rate for that case. Table 3 also
presents the deflation from this change—i.e., the percent by
which our observations dropped when collapsing simultaneous
patent assertions.132
Table 3: Rate of Administrative Challenge by Year Collapsing
Simultaneous Defendants
Year
Percent of
Total
Percent Case
Eligible Cases Eligible
Deflation
with an
Cases
Administrative
Challenge
2008
6.72%
1,829
5.77%
2009

6.49%

2,173

3.59%

2010

6.09%

2,873

10.58%

2011

7.07%

3,593

15.72%

2012

7.10%

5,383

37.78%

2013

13.52% ***

6,570

43.93%

2014

16.26% ***

5,955

38.53%

2015

16.03% ***

5,753

42.58%

2008–2015

11.29%

34,129

34.05%

*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from
2008 at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

132. See Table 3, infra. Note that deflation is calculated relative to the
dataset just before patent assertions on the same day and in the same court are
collapsed. Thus, it is the percent difference between the case numbers in Table
2 and Table 3.
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Overall, the size of the dataset decreases by about onethird.133 While a full causal evaluation of the effect of the AIA
switch from the Rule 20 standard is beyond the scope of this
paper, the composition of the caseload is consistent with its
expected effect. Treating simultaneous assertions as one case
only reduced the general caseload in 2008 by about five percent;
in 2013 this change decreased the caseload by over forty
percent.134 Indeed, the incidence of simultaneous assertion
under separate case numbers appears much greater post-AIA
than before.135 Still, the general rise of administrative
challenges—while elevated in magnitude when collapsing
cases—follows roughly the same pattern. The difference from
2008 becomes statistically significant the same year we see the
largest rise—nearly a doubling —from 2012 to 2013.136
Because we seek in part to compare pre- and post-AIA
periods, we maintain this collapsed level of observations for the
remainder of our analysis.137 Further, this level of analysis helps
by making sure that the non-challenged case numbers of a
challenged patent do not mask its status as a challenged patent.
To be clear—for the remainder of the analysis, we no longer refer
to a case as a unique patent-case combination. Instead, when we
say “case,” we refer to a unique patent, litigated in one court,
against any number of parties, on a unique date.
D. SETTLEMENTS
Cases that result in an administrative challenge might be
different from other cases because they chose an administrative
challenge rather than a court challenge, or because the
defendants attempted to adjudicate validity at all as opposed to
settling early. As established in other literature, most patent
cases do not reach a final determination on the merits.138
Therefore, cases with an administrative challenge occupy a
133. See Table 3, supra.
134. Id.
135. Id. See also Cotropia et. al, supra note 14, at 666 (finding that a
difference between 2,520 patent infringement lawsuits in 2010 and 5,187 patent
infringement lawsuits in 2012 “is largely explained by the AIA change in joinder
rules”).
136. See Table 3, supra.
137. When collapsing in this way, nearly all patent covariate will stay the
same because they do not change across observations that share a patent,
litigation date, and court. To the extent that these cases have multiple judges,
the judge from the case listed first in the dataset is chosen.
138. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 41.
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portion of a special subset of cases that proceed meaningfully
toward a validity challenge.139 As a next step, it is important to
ask whether cases with administrative challenges differ further
from cases that did move meaningfully toward adjudication, but
remained in the district court.
We look now to each case’s duration: the time between a
case’s filing date and the date of its eventual termination (in
days). While we are not able to identify the precise outcome for
our cases—settlement, dismissal, or otherwise—we can compare
those cases that ended quickly, versus those that lasted longer.
Figure 3 presents a histogram of the case duration for our nonchallenged but eligible cases.
Figure 3: Time Between Case Filing and Termination for NonChallenged Cases

Any attempt to draw a line between “early” and “non-early”
termination is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but we use one
year as the divider for a key reason. Because IPR requests must
be filed within one year of the litigation date,140 cases that
continue on beyond one year have presumably chosen to
139. Note that the filing of an IPX challenges should usually result in a
validity determination. By contrast, an IPR petition may itself settle, and may
not always lead to a decision on validity. Still, parties who chose to file an IPR
clearly took some steps towards adjudicating the validity of a patent, while
parties who settle very early may have taken none at all.
140. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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continue the case in district court, instead of requesting an
administrative challenge. By contrast, cases that terminate in
one year—without requesting an administrative challenge—
settled or otherwise resolved the case before a decision had to be
made on requesting an administrative challenge. For IPX, the
lines are less clear-cut, but the general principle remains; we
also use one year as our threshold for cases in the IPX period for
consistency.
Over half (fifty-eight percent) of our cases that did not lead
to an administrative challenge were resolved early. That is,
many cases do not lead to a challenge request simply because the
cases are not long in dispute—they settle quickly or resolve
quickly. Because only a minority of cases continue beyond one
year to even begin to seriously adjudicate validity, the
proportion of cases that use administrative challenges,
conditional on attempting to adjudicate validity at all, is higher
than the unconditional proportion.
In the remainder of this piece, we seek to identify how
various characteristics are associated with the decision to
request an administrative challenge in litigation. Along the way,
we check for robustness of results within this more narrowlydefined subset of cases that did not terminate quickly. That is,
for some future analyses, we restrict our “non-challenged” set to
only those cases that proceeded on in the district court for longer
than one year.
In closing, we note that while this adjustment is aimed
primarily at settlements, it may also help to reduce other sources
of potential complication and redundancy in the dataset. As the
previous subsections have demonstrated, litigation data can be
extremely complicated and interconnected; what we might
substantively consider a single “case” could appear as many
observations in our initial dataset. To the extent that these
multiple observations use the same filing date and appear
within the same court, the adjustment in Section IV.C can
mitigate this issue. But further complexity could arise if cases
appear multiple times upon being transferred from one court to
another, if multiple cases appear both independently and
consolidated, and any other technical changes that could further
lead to repetition. The alternate dataset created in this Section
(and used in some of the later analysis) could at least partially
reduce the effect of these complications, by removing “non-
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challenged” cases that are marked with early termination dates
due to transfer or consolidation.141
V. HOW MUCH DOES THE INFRINGEMENT VENUE
MATTER?
A. VARIATION BY COURT
Our data on litigation filings includes the district that the
lawsuit was filed in. The distribution of cases among districts is
highly concentrated. There are ninety-two unique districts
represented in our sample. If cases were uniformly distributed,
we would expect to see just over one percent of the total cases
occurring in each district. This is not the case. The vast majority
of districts in our sample see an extremely small fraction of
patent cases. Only twenty-four districts see greater than one
percent of the cases. Two districts alone hear over one quarter of
all challenge-eligible patent cases; the District of Delaware and
the Eastern District of Texas each heard about fifteen percent of
the cases in our sample.
An interesting question, of course, is whether there are
substantial differences in administrative challenge rates across
districts. Table 4 presents the challenge rate for each of the
twenty-five most common districts in our sample.
Table 4: Rate of Administrative Challenge by District
Court
DED
TXED
CACD
NJD
CAND

Number of Cases
5,465
5,128
2,255
2,223
1,861

Challenge Rate
13.52% ***
15.00% ***
10.69%
7.24% ***
17.62% ***

141. Note that the dataset restriction in this Section only applies to the set
of cases that are not matched to a challenge within 18 months. Because our goal
is to identify all cases where a challenge was filed, dropping cases that are
matched to a challenge because the district court case also terminated early
would exclude many challenges from our analysis. It would also have the
paradoxical result of dropping from the analysis challenges where a defendant
quickly requests a challenge, puts forth strong evidence of invalidity, perhaps
leading to the institution of an IPR, and the plaintiff subsequently drops the
infringement suit. Still, in the context of reducing dataset complexity and
redundancy, this approach leads to a limitation. Cases that are transferred
quickly but also lead to a challenge, for example, could still appear twice in the
dataset, and would be coded both times as having led to a challenge.
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ILND
1,777
7.71% ***
NYSD
1,043
5.56% ***
FLSD
912
2.63% ***
VAED
750
13.07%
CASD
739
11.91%
MAD
718
16.16% ***
UTD
640
7.50% ***
FLMD
567
8.47% **
MND
546
12.82%
TXND
509
10.02%
MIED
477
11.95%
MOWD
422
1.66 ***
NVD
416
9.38%
GAND
407
9.34%
TXWD
364
17.03% ***
OHND
347
8.07% *
COD
345
5.51% ***
WAWD
332
5.72% ***
WIWD
314
14.65% *
TXSD
306
16.99% ***
National Average
34,129
11.29%
*, **, *** indicate that the value is statistically different from
the national average at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
The variation in administrative challenge use across
districts is substantial. While the Northern District of California
sees administrative challenges in nearly one out of every five
cases, the Western District of Missouri sees challenges in fewer
than one out of every fifty. The District of Delaware and the
Eastern District of Texas—by far the two most common districts
in our sample—both have rates of administrative challenges
that are slightly higher than the national average. As shown in
Table 5, we regress all districts on whether or not each case
involved a challenge. Using an F-test, we can strongly reject the
hypothesis that all court coefficients are jointly equal to zero.
That is, we find evidence of heterogeneity in challenge rates
across courts.
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Table 5: F-Test for Joint Significance of Courts
Court FE

Test (Num., DoF)

F-Statistic

F(91, 34037)

8.05 ***

Notes: An OLS model was run where the dependent variable
is “challenged”; challenged cases are those where the litigated
patent was matched to an IPX or IPR occurring within 18
months. “Non-challenged” cases are those that could not be
matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within 18 months). The
model included dummies for 91 courts (one was omitted to run
the regression) and a constant. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
But who would really expect differences across courts to be
driven by random chance? On the contrary, a growing body of
scholarship has documented the phenomenon of “court
shopping.”142 Therefore, the parties and cases that select into a
particular court might be quite different from those who select
another. For example, patentees who choose to bring their
infringement suits in district X might be particularly eager to
settle the case, preempting any administrative challenge. These
differences in selection might lead to a higher or lower challenge
rate not because of anything the court did, but simply by virtue
of the types of cases the court attracts.
Still, characteristics of a particular court may well affect a
defendant’s decision to bring suit. In IPR the decision of whether
to grant a stay of the district court action is discretionary. Courts
that are particularly hostile to stays might see fewer
administrative challenges filed for their cases. Likewise, courts
that are known to have a particular competency or speed for
handling patent cases might obviate the need to go to the patent
office to get a fair and speedy validity decision. In any event, the
effects of the court’s policies from the selection effects are
difficult to disentangle. In the next subsection we tackle this
problem by focusing not on courts, but on particular judges—
where there is likely high heterogeneity in practices but lower
selection bias.

142. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 99.
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B. VARIATION BY JUDGE
While “court shopping” in patent litigation is substantial,
“judge shopping” appears to be largely nonexistent. As Professor
Anderson has noted, most districts have put in place some
procedures to reduce or eliminate a party’s ability to select a
particular judge.143 With the possible exception of the Eastern
District of Texas—where procedures may actually encourage
judge shopping—litigants file an infringement suit without
knowing who their judge is going to be.144 Therefore, we are
relatively less worried that observed differences in
administrative challenge rates across judges are driven by
differences in the cases to which they are assigned. Of course,
this is conditional on the court—we are interested in differences
in judges within the same court; differences in judges from
different courts would be marred by the same “court shopping”
selection bias as before.
We test this hypothesis by running a series of F-tests of the
joint significance of judge dummies within each of the most
common 25 courts. Because the composition of courts changes
over time, we also control for litigation quarter to reduce the
concern that any significance of judge dummies might be
attributable solely to changes in the challenge rate over time. As
shown in Table 6 below, we can strongly reject the hypothesis
that all judge coefficients are jointly equal to zero for all but two
courts. That is, even within a particular district, the judge
assigned is associated with the odds that a defendant requests
an administrative challenge. This is also true for the Eastern
District of Texas—lending questions as to whether or not judge
selection plays a role in challenge decisions. Some patentees who
are particularly opposed to administrative challenges, for
example, might file in the Eastern District and select the judge
most opposed to stays.

143. See J. Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas,
48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 539, 544 (2016) (describing how random assignment usually
limits judge shopping).
144. See id. at 546 (explaining that the Eastern District of Texas has
modified its assignment procedure so as to “create a means of judge shopping”).
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Table 6: F-Test for Joint Significance of Judges Within
Various Courts
Test
F-Statistic
(Num., DoF)
F(27, 5394)
7.01 ***
DED
F(20, 5070)
8.33 ***
TXED
F(48, 2173)
1.57 ***
CACD
F(28, 2102)
4.17 ***
NJD
F(37,
1753)
5.03 ***
CAND
F(51, 1672)
1.96 ***
ILND
F(52, 959)
2.40 ***
NYSD
F(28, 852)
1.89 ***
FLSD
F(17, 701)
6.76 ***
VAED
F(17,
688)
2.96 ***
CASD
F(24, 647)
5.39 ***
MAD
F(16, 589)
1.74 ***
UTD
F(27, 507)
2.77 ***
FLMD
F(15, 493)
7.99 ***
MND
F(12,
460)
3.04 ***
TXND
F(30, 407)
2.93 ***
MIED
F(12, 388)
28.40 ***
MOWD
F(13, 371)
1.992 **
NVD
F(19, 356)
1.67 **
GAND
F(16,
314)
1.66 *
TXWD
F(16, 299)
3.12 ***
OHND
F(21, 293)
2.01 ***
COD
F(12, 288)
4.46 ***
WAWD
F(5, 277)
0.34
WIWD
F(15,
258)
3.42
***
TXSD
Notes: Each row reflects the result of an F-test for the joint
significance of judge dummies in an OLS model that was run
using only the observations associated with each court. The
dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are those
where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those
that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within
18 months). Each model included quarterly FE, judge FE and a
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constant. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% respectively.
Still, many judges in other districts—presumably those who
were assigned to the parties at random—have differences in the
rate at which their cases use administrative challenges that are
unlikely to be explained by random variation. These differences
could be explained by the broad power judges have over their
cases and the many different ways they might push litigation
defendants into particular strategies. As Professor Anderson
notes, experienced trial litigators know that the judge assigned
is extremely important.145 Now, we dig deeper to test potential
sources of this observed heterogeneity among judge assignment.
Put simply, we seek to shed light on the following question: why
does the particular judge assigned matter to defendants?
One explanation could be the judge’s propensity to grant
stays. If a certain judge is especially hostile toward granting a
stay, we might expect that defendants would be less likely to
request an administrative challenge for fear of having to incur
duplicate costs as both proceedings move forward. It is difficult
to empirically test for the effect of a judge’s stay propensity for
two reasons. First, there is data sparsity: because
administrative challenges are rare, motions for stay pending IPX
or IPR are also relatively rare, and thus many judges would see
few if any such motions. Second, such analysis would likely
suffer from a reverse causality problem: higher stay grant rates
might imply higher challenge rates, but the request of each
challenge could drive up the judge’s grant rate.
Still, much of the difference might not be specific to
administrative challenge stays, or even to patent law. Instead,
whether a defendant chooses to request an administrative
challenge might be informed by the judge’s general docket
management. A particular judge might move extremely quickly,
pushing parties into quick settlements, or resolving key issues
on early motions to dismiss. Such judges might not take kindly
to delays of any kind, including stays pending patent office
review of validity.

145. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 143, at 544 (“Litigators report that the
judge assigned to a case can be the key to winning that case.”).
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VI. HOW MUCH DOES THE PATENT AT-ISSUE MATTER?
Most variables of interest to us are patent-specific; we make
use of several other datasets to gain information on the patent
at-issue in each observation. To obtain data on each patent, we
combine data from a variety of databases, each of which is put
out by the USPTO. For example, Patent Examination Research
Dataset (PatEx)146 provides basic information such as filing
date, patent grant date, and patent class.147 We separate out two
characteristics for future analysis: patents issued to small
entities and patents owned by PAEs.
A. INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS
First, we focus on characteristics that are present at the
time of a patent’s issuance, and that do not change throughout a
patent’s life. These are often referred to as “intrinsic
characteristics” in the literature.148 Table 7 describes the
intrinsic characteristics of the patents at-issue in our
constructed challenged and non-challenged case samples. We
also perform tests comparing the means between the challenged
and non-challenged subsets.149 In every observable category, the
patents at-issue in cases that led to an administrative challenge
are significantly different from those in non-challenged cases.

146. See Graham, et al., supra note 111.
147. See
generally
NBER
PATENT
DATA
PROJECT,
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads/patn-datadescription (providing a system, used by this paper, which accounts for changes
in patent classes using “six NBER Technology categories,” because “the USPTO
continually revises the technology classes”).
148. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 29.
149. More specifically, we perform two-sample two-tailed t-tests of equality
for continuous variables (e.g. citations), and similar tests of proportion equality
for binary variables (e.g. small entity status).
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Table 7: Intrinsic Characteristics of Challenged Patents
NonChallenged

Challenged

p-value

Total claims

27.872

30.129

0.000 ***

Independent
claims

3.910

4.246

0.000 ***

Min. word in
ind. claims

125.373

128.723

0.020 **

Back citation
per claim

2.704

2.954

0.014 **

Prosecution
per claim
(days)

79.595

67.773

0.000 ***

Chemical

0.045

0.039

0.099 *

Computer &
Comm.

0.425

0.514

0.000 ***

Drugs &
Medical

0.205

0.135

0.000 ***

Electrical &
Electronic

0.097

0.148

0.000 ***

Mechanical

0.095

0.056

0.000 ***

Others

0.133

0.108

0.000 ***

We obtain data on patent claims from the Patent Claims
Research Dataset.150 This dataset provides the number and word
count statistics for both independent and dependent claims.
Following the researchers who created this dataset, we focus
primarily on the number of independent claims and the
150. Patent
Claims
Research
Dataset,
USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patentclaims-research-dataset.
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minimum word count in independent claims.151 Their theory is
that patents with more independent claims and a smaller
minimum word count should be of broader scope.152 This makes
intuitive sense. We would expect additional claims to add
additional scope of protection. Likewise, there is good reason to
believe that claims with few words are broader than claims with
more words. Just as “a paper” is a broader description than “a
law review paper.” For completeness, we also use a measure of
total claims in some of our analysis, which we generate by
summing the dependent and independent claim counts.
Challenged cases involve patents with, on average, two more
claims and 0.3 more independent claims. While this tends to
imply patents of greater breadth, challenged patents tend to also
have a greater minimum number of words in their independent
claims, which might conversely signify a narrower scope.
The USPTO Patentsview Database153 allows us to find the
number of backward citations, which is commonly used as a
proxy for patent value.154 From this database, we extract files
detailing every time one patent cites another patent. Backward
citations are generated by tabulating, for a particular patent, the
number of other patents it cites.155 Following Lanjouw and
Shankerman,156 we generate per-claim variants for backward
citations, as well as for prosecution time. Challenged patents
spend less time in their initial examination—eight fewer days
per claim—but also cite a greater number of prior art patents in
the examination process.
The breakdown of technology categories is also quite
different between the two groups. Challenged cases involve a
greater fraction of computer & communication patents, and
electrical & electronic patents. The opposite is true for chemical,
drugs & medical, mechanical, and other patents.

151. See Alan C. Marco, Joshua D. Sarnoff & Charles deGrazia, Patent
Claims and Patent Scope, 48 RES. POL’Y 103790 (2019).
152. Id.
153. PATENTSVIEW, http://www.patentsview.org/web/#viz/comparisons.
154. See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, Federic M. Scherer & Katrin Vopel,
Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights, 32 RES. POL’Y
1343 (2003).
155. We manually set the value of backward citations to zero for any patent
with no record of citations.
156. See Lanjouw & Shankerman, supra note 30, at 134.
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B. ACQUIRED CHARACTERISTICS
In Table 8, we present a similar analysis for “acquired”
characteristics of the patent at the time of litigation.
Table 8: Acquired Characteristics of Challenged Patents
NonChallenged
p-value
Challenged
Age
1959.151
2004.376
0.128
(days)
Annual
forward
0.206
0.229
0.022 **
citations
per claim
Assigned

0.529

0.563

0.000 ***

First, we define age as the number of days between the date
that a patent is issued and the date it is litigated. There is no
significant difference in age between patents in cases with or
without an administrative challenge. Next, we create a measure
of forward citations by summing the number of times a
particular patent is cited by another patent.157 Forward citations
are recorded as the total citations that accrued as of a particular
date (December 26, 2017). This creates a truncation issue with
forward citations since older patents have had more time to
accrue citations. To alleviate this problem we normalize the
number of citations by the number of years between the patent’s
issue date and the date we collected forward citations.158 The
combination of these two transformations results in the new

157. This data is also pulled from the PatentsView database. We manually
set the value of forward citations for any patent with no record of citations, as
this database is comprehensive for patents issued from the 1970s through the
end of 2015.
158. There seems to be no perfect way to correct for truncation. See Bronwyn
H. Hall, Adam B Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citation Data
File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools (NBER Working Paper No.
8498, 2001) (illustrating limitations of different methods, including the “fixed
window” approach). Our data only includes total citations on a specific date,
which is why we correct for truncation by finding the annual average. If
citations increase at an increasing rate, we might be somewhat
underestimating annual citations for younger patents. This concern is
alleviated in our analysis because we later match patents using filing date and
patent class.
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forward citations variable “annual citations per claim.”
Challenged patents have, on average, slightly higher forward
citations. This might indicate that they are of particularly high
value.159
Finally, we seek to determine whether or not a patent was
assigned prior to litigation. In earlier work, Professor Chien
found that assignment was an important predictor of
litigation.160 We seek here to see whether it is also an important
predictor of administrative challenge. We merge our existing
dataset with the Patent Assignment Dataset which records the
assignment dates for patents.161 Our ability to determine the
identity of the assignee is very limited. We narrow down as best
we can to those assignments that appear to most closely
resemble a true sale of a patent to another entity. We exclude
any assignments tagged as name changes, government or
security interests, corrections, and mergers. Likewise, we
exclude any assignment that the PTO has flagged as likely from
an individual inventor to her employer. Over half of all cases in
our sample dealt with patents that had been assigned prior to
litigation. Cases where there was an administrative challenge
dealt with a greater share of patents that were assigned.
C. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
While the t-tests for comparisons of means presented in this
and the previous section offer some insights for how these groups
differ, each of the variables in that table is compared
independently of other variables. Now we perform more rigorous
analysis using multivariate regression that accounts for possible
correlations between the variables. Specifically, we use these
regressions to identify the variables that predict whether a
particular litigated patent will also be administratively
challenged. The dependent variable takes the value 1 for our
challenged group (patent-cases that are matched to an
administrative challenge within eighteen months) and 0 for the
control patents (patent-cases eligible for an administrative

159. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009);
Harhoff, Scherer & Vopel, supra note 154, at 1345.
160. Chien, supra note 29, at 303–04.
161. See Alan C. Marco et al., The USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset:
Descriptions and Analysis (USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2849634.
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challenge but with no such challenge filed within eighteen
months).
Unlike some previous literature that looks at the
characteristics
of
litigated
patents
using
matching
techniques,162 we are able to make use of our full sample, and
with a smaller control set, finding good matches to all challenges
might not be feasible. Matching is useful in cases where a binary
outcome is rare, which could introduce bias in certain kinds of
statistical analysis, as well as making data gathering and
computation costly.163 When comparing litigated patents to the
millions of unlitigated patents, the former dwarfs the latter:
indicating that matching is necessary.164 By contrast, we
compare challenged cases to other litigated cases, which are
decidedly less rare. About eleven percent of the cases in our
sample are challenged, which is about five to ten times greater
than the proportion of patents that are litigated.165 Where the
previous authors also used their matching technique to control
for cohort and class effects,166 we instead use fixed effects to
control for these effects over the entire sample.
In Table 9, we present the results of this exercise, using a
linear probability model (ordinary least squares regression on a
binary outcome). All columns use fixed effects for the district
court.167 Column (1) uses the intrinsic patent characteristics as
162. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Shankerman, supra note 30; Chien, supra note 29.
163. See generally Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare
Events Data, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 137 (2001) (examining techniques for statistical
analysis of rare events).
164. See Chien, supra note 29, at 309 (citing King, supra note 163, at 138).
(“I used these sets, rather than a random sample drawn from patents generally,
because the application of statistical analysis to rare events like patent
litigation tends to distort and understate the probability that the events will
occur.”).
165. See Ansell et. al., 2018 Patent Litigation Study, PWC (2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-pwc-patentlitigation-study.pdf (figure 1, showing that the ratio of number of patent cases
filed each year to the number of patents granted in that same year is about 1:50
to 1:100 during the period of our study).
166. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Shankerman, supra note 30, at 133.
167. We cluster our standard errors at the district court level and at the
patent level (some patents appear multiple times in our sample). For examples
of clustering in similar contexts, see generally Alma Cohen & Crystal S. Yang,
Judicial Politics and Sentencing Decisions, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON POL’Y 160,
173 (2019) (using bootstrapped standard errors stratified by district court for
various models with court or judge fixed effects, and noting that “results are
robust to clustering standard errors at the district level”); Will Dobbie et al.,
The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV.
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well as dummies for the patent filing year and NBER technology
category to control for possible cohort and technology area
effects. Column (2) adds in the acquired patent characteristics.
Column (3) adds indicators for small entity patents and PAE
plaintiffs, which are discussed in more detail in the following
subsections. Finally, Column (4) adds fixed effects for district
court judges. In the Appendix, Table A2 repeats the analysis of
Table 9, but replaces NBER categories with USPC classes to
more granularly control for class effects. Table A3 repeats the
analysis of Table 9, but removes from the set of non-challenged
cases those cases that terminated early.
In general, many of the bivariate differences between
challenged and non-challenged cases that we saw in the
preceding sections do not appear as significant in the
multivariate models. For example, in some specifications,
independent claims or minimum words in independent claims
show up significant or marginally significant (and in a direction
that would support a positive relationship between broader
scope and challenges), but this result is more often insignificant.
We believe that much of this disparity between the bivariate and
multivariate statistics can be attributed to systematic selection
across courts and time.168 That is, while the broad pool of
challenged patents has indicators of higher value or broader
scope via claims and citation metrics compared to the broad nonchallenged pool, our models suggest that this is substantially

201 (2018) (using court by time fixed effects along with a judge instrument and
two-way clustering by judge and individual); Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge
Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence
from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1342 (2014) (using district-court fixed
effects and noting that “[a]ll standard errors are clustered at the district
courthouse level to account for serial correlation”). In implementing the models
with several levels of fixed effects and clustering on two variables, we use the
estimator described by Correia. See Sergio Correia, Linear Models with HighDimensional Fixed Effects: An Efficient and Feasible Estimator (Working paper
2017), http://scorreia.com/research/hdfe.pdf. In addition to the package by
Correia, our analysis (performed in Stata 14) and the creation of the tables and
figures presented throughout this Article were aided by several specialized
packages. See Ben Jann, Making Regression Tables Simplified, 7 THE STATA J.
227 (2007); Michael Stepner, BINSCATTER: Stata Module to Generate Binned
Scatterplots, Statistical Software Components S457709, Boston College
Department of Economics (2013); Roy Wada, OUTREG2: Stata Module to
Arrange Regression Outputs into an Illustrative Table, Statistical Software
Components S456416, Boston College Department of Economics (2014).
168. We found claims and citations results, in particular, to be sensitive to
the addition of time and court fixed effects and appropriately clustered errors.
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driven by where and when the patent is litigated. Therefore,
caution is needed when interpreting the bivariate results.
Our results that might speak to patent quality do so
ambiguously. On the one hand, we find that patents with a
greater number of backward citations—which could indicate a
more diligent search effort—are more likely to be challenged,
although their significance is reduced in several models,
particularly when controlling for USPC classes.169 On the other
hand, the amount of time (per claim) that a patent spent being
prosecuted at the patent office appears negatively associated
with challenges. If we believe that more time at the patent office
is associated with a more thorough examination of the patent,
we might expect that the patents with higher prosecution times
are of higher quality.170
Compared to other patents, litigated drugs & medical
patents are significantly less likely to be challenged in most
specifications, as are mechanical patents, though the latter loses
significance in the face of judge fixed effects. On the other hand,
litigated computers & communications and electrical &
electronic patents are significantly more likely to be challenged.
This might indicate that norms have been established in various
industries—or their respective bars—for how patent disputes
will play out. Another important factor could be differences in
the original patent examination process by technology class.
Certain areas might have differences in how likely prior art is to
be found during the examination process. This result might also
indicate the perceived incremental benefit of Administrative
Patent Judges (APJs) as decision makers in various contexts.
Defense attorneys might worry more about the prospect of
explaining a computer or electronic invention to a generalist
district court judge or jury than the same for a drug or
mechanical patent. Or, on the flipside, APJs in the former two
fields might be perceived as especially fair or skilled.
Importantly, Table A3 shows that the majority of the results
above still hold when comparing challenged cases to only cases
169. Another possible interpretation of backward citations is that a smaller
number of backward citations may indicate that “the invention is in a relatively
new technology area,” which would imply here that patents in new technology
areas are less likely to be challenged. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note
30, at 141.
170. Note, however, that one study found that examination time is not a
significant predictor of Federal Circuit patent validity decisions. See Ronald J.
Mann & Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent
Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMP. L. STUD. 1, 19–21 (2012).
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that did not terminate early. In other words, the effects of many
patent characteristics cannot be explained by differences in
settlement rates. Even compared to cases that proceed
meaningfully toward adjudication in the district court, patents
involved in challenged cases tend to cite more prior art, spend
less time under prosecution, are less likely to be drug or
mechanical patents, and are more likely to be electrical patents.
Still, when restricting the set of non-challenged patents, we also
see several different results. Compared to the set of longerlasting non-challenged patents, challenged patents are less
likely to be chemical patents but no more or less likely to be
computer patents. They are also more likely to be younger, and
to have been assigned at the time of litigation.
Most notably, when removing those non-challenged patents
that settled or otherwise terminated within one-year, annual
forward citations per claim are positively associated with the
probability of challenge, and statistically significant at the 5
percent level. While earlier work has shown that litigated
patents are of higher value compared to the overall population
of U.S. patents,171 our analysis here further suggests that
patents concurrently challenged at the patent office tend to be
even more valuable than other litigated patents, when the latter
continue on in the district court beyond one year. Because the
set of litigated patents that continue in district court beyond one
year is meant to exclude those patents that settled early
(choosing neither adjudication at the patent office nor
meaningful adjudication in the district court), we believe this
comparison is well suited to address the core substitution
hypothesis172 that underlies much of the possible welfare effects
from administrative challenges. That is, this model is focused on
patents for which it seems most likely that the parties faced a
choice to adjudicate validity at the patent office versus at the
district court, potentially saving cost and time.173

171. See, e.g. Chien, supra note 29, at 326 (“All other things equal, valuable
patents are more likely to be litigated.”).
172. See generally Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9.
173. Of course, this interpretation rests on several large assumptions. First,
we assume that both those cases where an administrative challenge is filed and
those cases that are pending in the district court for more than one year reflect
a meaningful step toward adjudication of validity. Recall that we do not drop
any challenged patents, even if the district court case that they arose from
terminates within one year. The theory behind this differential treatment is
that the substantial work that does into filing an IPX or IPR petition represents
a meaningful step toward challenge to validity that is more analogous to a court
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This result could have several interesting implications for
policymakers. The increased value of these patents likely also
indicates that there is more “at stake” in the dispute.174 On its
face, if policymakers hoped to push the validity challenges in
especially high-stakes disputes from the courts to the patent
office, they appear to be succeeding. And, as the costs of
litigation increase with the amount at stake,175 having the
highest value patents bifurcating their trials to utilize the lower
cost validity determination procedure could maximize the cost
differential, and thus the cost savings, from these procedures. 176
Further, our results suggest important implications for
overall patent quality. If we believe that the patent office is a
more accurate judge of patent quality than the district courts, it
might be comforting to know that the most valuable patents are
being reviewed there. In addition, because evidence suggests
that administrative review results in more decisions on validity
than in the district court,177 we might expect the overall quality
of the granted patent pool to rise. In short, policymakers might
be relieved to discover that our findings lend some support to the

case that proceeds for longer than one year. By contrast, we expect that many
cases that terminate within one year would reflect quick settlement without
incurring significant litigation costs, and thus a switch from the usual district
court outcome to an administrative challenge could actually increase cost. Of
course, we also assume that challenges are associated with cost savings at the
district court. These assumptions would weaken substantially to the extent that
(i) many of the administratively challenged cases are subsequently settled or
dropped, which would make them more analogous to the early settled district
court cases, (ii) many of the cases that proceed beyond one year in district court
incur few costs or make no meaningful efforts toward adjudicating validity, or
(iii) stays are not granted or requested, meaning that the challenged cases in
our sample continue to run in parallel with their associated district court case
and incurring both sets of costs.
174. Talia Bar & Jesse Kalinowski, Patent Validity and the Timing of
Settlements, 67 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. (2019). (showing that when an infringer
expects higher damages she would exert more effort searching for prior art in
an attempt to invalidate a patent). One possible explanation for our observation
that challenged patents are more likely to have more forward citations than
other litigated patents is that a patent’s increased value is an indication of
higher expected damages.
175. AIPLA REPORT, supra note 43, at 37–41.
176. This, of course, depends on the counterfactual of those cases which were
selected into these challenges. It is possible that had administrative review not
been available, the parties might have not adjudicated validity in the district
courts at all, but rather settled. In this case, use of patent office challenges
might be increasing the dispute costs borne on the parties. Further
investigation into settlements is needed to shed light on this question.
177. See Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 110.
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idea that administrative patent procedures may be diverting
especially high value patents away from the district court.
Table 9: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

Intrinsic
Patent
Characte
ristics

Add
Acquired
Characte
ristics

Add
Small
Entity
and PAE

Add
Judges

Independent
claims

0.001

0.001

0.001*

0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.001

-0.002

-0.002

-0.004

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.001**

0.001*

0.001**

0.001*

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Min. word in ind.
Claims/100
Back citations per
claim
Prosecution per
claim (years)
Chemical
Computer &
Comm.
Drug & Medical
Electrical &
Electronic
Mechanical

-0.017*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

-0.005

-0.005

-0.010

-0.014

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.019)

(0.017)

0.027**

0.024**

0.033***

0.030***

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.011)

-0.026

-0.027*

-0.036**

-0.037**

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.018)

0.052***

0.050***

0.050***

0.049***

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.019)

(0.017)

-0.023**

-0.023**

-0.020**

-0.014
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(0.010)

Age (years)
Forward Citations
per year per claim
Assigned

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.011)

-0.002

-0.002

-0.003

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.010

0.010

0.009

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.004

0.014

0.012

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.008)

-0.024**

-0.021**

(0.011)

(0.010)

Small entity
indicator
PAE
Constant
Patent Filing Year
FE
District Court FE

-0.040*** -0.035***
(0.008)

(0.009)

-0.084*** -0.041

-0.026

-0.018

(0.021)

(0.055)

(0.053)

(0.060)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

Observations

33,459

33,459

33,459

33,095

R-squared

0.049

0.050

0.053

0.128

Litigation Quarter
FE
Judge FE

Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases
are those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or
IPR occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are
those that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR
within 18 months). All models are linear probability models.
Standard errors, clustered by district court and patent, in
parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively.
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C. SMALL ENTITY PATENTS
Small-scale inventors and their relative standing compared
to larger firms can have important implications for
innovation.178 Earlier studies have shown, however, that small
patentees are disadvantaged when it comes to protecting their
patent rights.179 Professors Lanjouw and Schankerman find that
patentees with small patent portfolios run a higher risk of
litigation.180 Professors Schankerman and Galasso show that
invalidation of patents owned by large firms induces more
follow-on innovation by small firms,181 and further show that a
loss of patent rights significantly increases the likelihood that
small firms stop patenting.182
As a preliminary matter, cases involving small entity
patents made up over one-quarter (28.3 percent) of all cases with
challenges. This number is slightly smaller than the proportion
of small entity patents in non-challenged cases (32.7 percent);
this difference is significant at the one percent level. In Column
(3) of Table 9, we add to the model a dummy variable that
indicates whether the patentee claimed small entity status. We
find that cases involving small entity patents are significantly
less likely to see concurrent administrative challenges. It is
interesting that the patents that are shown to have a higher risk
of litigation still have a lower risk of administrative challenge.
It is also worth noting that because our dataset uses
infringement suits, small entity patentees (to the extent the
party asserting the patent is the same party that filed the
patent) are likely to be the plaintiffs in the litigation case, and
not the defendants. Therefore, defendants may be making
strategic decisions to challenge small entity patents in the
district court instead of at the patent office. Perhaps this implies
that the types of challenges made to small entity patentees are
those more amenable to district court challenge (i.e., challenges
other than novelty or nonobviousness). Or, perhaps defendants
178. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that a
disparity between large and small patent firms “will have implications for the
industrial organization of innovative activity”).
179. Id. (finding that “small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in
protecting their patent rights” compared to patentees with a large portfolio of
patents).
180. Id.
181. See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative
Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q. J. ECON. 317 (2015).
182. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Rights, Innovation and
Firm Exit 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21769, 2015).
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prefer to exploit the limited resources of small entity patentees
by dragging out costly civil litigation instead of using the
cheaper and faster administrative alternative so as to
incentivize them to settle in terms favorable to the alleged
infringers.
We find that small entity patents are less likely to be
challenged by defendants. This result on small entity patents is
curious in light of a result in other work: small entity patents
are more likely to be invalidated at the patent office.183 If small
entity patents are easier to invalidate at the patent office than
other patents, we might expect defendants to be challenging
them much more frequently at the patent office. We could
perhaps reconcile these results by the existence of settlements.
Knowing that they face poor outcomes in administrative
challenges, small entity patentees may be more likely to settle
early and avoid the patent office altogether.
Indeed, Column (3) of Table A3 is consistent with this
hypothesis. When comparing challenged cases to those that did
not challenge but did not terminate early, small entity status is
no longer a significant predictor of challenge requests. That is,
the difference in challenge rates for small entity patents appears
to be driven by those cases that terminate early, likely often by
settlement. This result adds to our understanding of how small
entity patentees behave in patent disputes.
D. CASES BROUGHT BY PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES
Significant work has been published in academic journals in
recent years on the question of patent assertion entities, or
PAEs.184 PAEs are often viewed to have different litigation
strategies than other patent infringement plaintiffs.185 These
strategies might lead to a different rate of administrative
challenge use for defendants.
We make use of the Stanford PAE dataset186 to identify
cases where the plaintiff was a patent asserter. We follow Miller

183. See Bar & Costello, supra note 25, at 30.
184. See generally Mazzeo et al., supra note 103 (analyzing case outcomes to
contribute data to this developing academic conversation).
185. Id.
186. We are grateful to Shawn Miller for sharing this data. Shawn P. Miller
et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Dataset (Oct. 23, 2017) (draft) (on file
with
Stanford
Law
School)
https://law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Introduction-to-the-Stanford-NPE-LitigationDataset-10.23.2017.pdf.
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et al.’s coding scheme and define PAE as a plaintiff that is a
member of categories one, four, or five.187 Because the data
provided to us is a ninety percent sample of the total caseload
over our period, we make one additional assumption to maximize
our data availability. We code patents that are missing for one
of our cases in the PAE dataset but asserted by a PAE at some
other time in that dataset as PAE asserted. Likewise, we assume
that patents never asserted by a PAE in the dataset—that is,
patents that were never asserted by a PAE over a fifteen-year
period—are not owned by PAEs.
As a preliminary matter, cases brought by patent assertion
entities made up nearly one-third (31.9 percent) of all cases with
challenges. This number is slightly smaller than the proportion
of PAE patents in non-challenged cases (32.3 percent), but the
difference is not significant. Thus, administrative challenges
seem to be handling a significant number of PAE cases, though
perhaps at a slightly lower rate than Article III courts are. To
the extent that policymakers hoped for administrative
challenges to serve as a second look at patents being asserted by
PAEs, these tribunals appear to certainly be fulfilling that
function.
That said, these numbers don’t tell us if these cases are
challenged with a lesser frequency because they are PAE
patents. Rather, PAEs may own patents that are
unrepresentative of the overall pool.188 The patents they hold
may be more or less likely to be challenged simply by nature of,
for example, having more citations or being in a certain art
category. In Column (3) of Table 9, we attempt to separate out
these effects by adding in a dummy for PAE status alongside our
other covariates. Controlling for other patent and case
characteristics, cases that involve PAE assertors are less likely
to lead to an administrative challenge.
One obvious explanation for this result is that PAE
asserters might be more likely to force a quick settlement before
adjudication proceeds at all.189 That is, defendants in PAE cases
might settle before they even consider whether to request an
administrative challenge. The results in Column (3) of Table A3
are consistent with this theory. When restricting non-challenged
cases to only those that last for longer than one year, the effect
187. Id. at 6.
188. See Cotropia et al., supra note 14, at 650–54 (explaining the difficulty
in categorizing PAEs and their impact on the patent landscape).
189. See, e.g., Love, Miller & Ambwani, supra note 9, at 73 n.19.
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of PAE is no longer statistically significant. That is, like with
small entities in the previous subsection, the difference in the
PAE litigation rate appears primarily driven by cases that settle
or otherwise terminate early.
VII. HAVE SELECTION PATTERNS CHANGED SINCE THE
AIA?
A. THE AIA AND THE RATE OF CHALLENGE
The figures and descriptive tables in Section IV.A appear to
show a significantly increased use of administrative review
procedures in the latter half of our sample period. This begs an
important question: did the America Invents Act and the shift to
inter partes review make challenges more appealing to
defendants? In the roughest of tests, we first divide our sample
into two parts. First, defendants in cases that were filed prior to
September 16, 2012 had inter partes reexamination available as
a tool at the time the case was filed, but not inter partes
review.190 Cases filed after that date, however, were no longer
eligible for IPX, but could make use of IPR. Within our window,
the rate of administrative challenge after the AIA is about
double that of the challenge rate prior to the AIA. Table 10
Column (1) presents the equivalent test in regression form,
using an AIA dummy (IPR) and the usual court fixed effects.
Of course, this two-period comparison is far from sufficient
to establish a causal story for a number of reasons. First,
dividing the sample into two halves might simply reduce a
continuous trend to a “high” and “low” period. That is, the latter
years would have been significantly greater following a growing
trend of challenge use, regardless of whether the AIA was put
into effect.
Relatedly, litigation strategies can change over time.
Indeed, the nature of our judicial system promotes changes in
the backdrop of litigation over time as caselaw develops.
Landmark cases may make it more difficult for challengers to
introduce evidence of invalidity, or may make it more difficult to
obtain stays. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that the
decision to file for an administrative challenge depends on
elements of the judicial system that are orthogonal to any
190. Supra Section II.A. Cases filed before but close to this date in theory
could have still used IPR before the one-year statutory bar took effect. Still, the
vast majority of cases in the first sample would be unable to do so. See also text
accompanying note 126, supra.
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particular case.191 In other words, the time at which a patent is
litigated may affect the likelihood that an administrative
challenge is filed. This could cast particular doubt on the
interpretation of our IPR variable, since it is the only variable
that changes with litigation timing. The variable, in particular,
could just be capturing changes in baseline rates of
administrative challenge, rather than any effect of the AIA in
particular.
Visually, Figure 4 shows the rate of challenges for each
quarter in our sample.192 Separate trend lines are provided for
the samples before and after the switch to the IPR regime. We
see that the rate of challenges over the IPX period appears
relatively constant over time, which is consistent with the lack
of significant yearly differences from 2008 until 2013 in Table
3.193 The IPR period, by contrast, is marked by a steeper slope of
increasing challenge rates. Notably, the increase in the IPR
period appears to level off after the first few quarters. As shown
in Figure 5, if you remove the policy change quarter and two
quarters before and after, the IPX and IPR periods appear to
have very similar slopes, and the change appears to be a change
in intercept. At the end of this Section, we discuss unique
features of the quarters surrounding the policy change, and
possible interpretations of the IPR effect as either a change in
slope or a discontinuous jump with a several quarter delay.

191. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 99, at 635 (2015) (explaining factors that
encourage forum shopping in district courts, despite uniform legal boundaries).
192. Note that Q3 2019 appears in this plot twice, separately for its IPX and
IPR observations.
193. Note that this result is not in tension with the published statistics of
increased yearly IPX filings over the same period, because they are measuring
different things. See Section II.B, supra. Our analysis looks at the rates at
which defendants file challenges, as a fraction of the total cases where the
patent is statutorily eligible for an IPX challenge. To the extent that the number
of IPX challenges increases, but there is also a corresponding increase in total
eligible cases, the actual challenge rate may stay the same.
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Figure 4: Challenge Rate by Litigation Quarter

Figure 5: Challenge Rate by Litigation Quarter, Excluding
Transition Quarters

While our earlier models from Section VI used quarterly
fixed effects to control for changes over time, the use of these
fixed effects alongside our AIA indicator would be inadvisable.
Because our AIA indicator is effectively equal to an indicator for
all cases filed in Q4 2019 or later, it is highly collinear with the
set of time fixed effects.194 Instead of fixed effects, Column (2) of
194. While the AIA indicator also extends slightly into Q2 2019, preventing
perfect collinearity, the variance inflation factor on the indicator in a simple
model with quarterly fixed effects is over 40. Models that attempt to use both
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Table 10 adds to the model a linear time trend, as well as the
time trend interacted with the AIA indicator to allow the trend
to vary before and after the policy change.195 In the full sample,
both the AIA indicator and the interaction term are positive and
significant, which suggests that the AIA is associated with both
an increased challenge rate and an increased acceleration of the
challenge rate (increased slope).
The other main issues with identifying an AIA effect can be
broadly categorized under the heading of omitted variable bias.
That is, the switch to AIA might have been correlated with
changes in the set of patents or cases that were litigated. If, for
example, the patents litigated after September 16, 2012,
coincidentally had greater claims, the effect of greater claims
(which is excluded in our first two columns) might be biasing the
AIA effect upwards. This problem would be particularly
pronounced if, for example, the AIA also changed the overall
quality of the set of patents filed or patents litigated.
To at least partially correct for this problem, in Column (3)
we control for the same observable patent characteristics as in
Column (4) of Table 9. Even simultaneously controlling for
observable patent characteristics, court and judge effects, and a
time trend, we still find a positive and significant effect of the
AIA dummy and the interacted slope of the time trend.
Appendix Table A4 presents results from additional models
as robustness checks. Columns (1) and (2) reproduce Column (3)
from Table 10 and mirror the earlier robustness checks set out
in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. Even when replacing NBER
categories with more granular patent classes or restricting the
set of non-challenged cases to those that did not terminate early,
the AIA dummy remains at least marginally significant and its
interaction with time remains strongly significant.
Using a time trend over the entire eight year sample could
present two disadvantages relative to using time fixed effects.
First, the legal landscape that impacts challenges decisions in
2008 could be very different from the legal landscape in 2015, in
the AIA indicator and quarterly fixed effects have varying significance on the
AIA indicator and are sensitive to the inclusion of various controls and in
particular the clustering of errors.
195. Of course, it is possible that using linear time trends could affect any
AIA effect if the rate of challenges over time followed a higher order polynomial
or non-parametric trend. We see little theoretical reason that over an eight-year
period that challenge rates would remain relatively constant for about five
years, increase rapidly coincidentally at the time of the switch from IPX to IPR,
and then flatten out again.
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ways that are not well captured by a time trend. Second, closer
to the AIA policy change, the rate of challenges could have been
growing at a steeper pre-existing trend that is not well fit by the
time trend over the entire sample. In Columns (3)–(5) of
Appendix Table A4, we restrict the sample to narrower windows
around the policy change, starting with eighteen months (on
either side of the switch to IPR) and then shrinking to twelve
and six months, respectively. While the AIA dummy is no longer
significant in the eighteen and twelve month windows, the
interaction with the time trend remains strongly significant. In
the narrowest 6 month window, neither the dummy nor the time
trend come up significant
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table A5, we reproduce Columns
(2) and (3) from Table 10, except that we replace the AIA dummy
and time trend with a full set of quarterly fixed effects to observe
more flexible patterns over time. With controls, the signs of the
fixed effects in the IPX period are mixed, and none of the
quarters are statistically significant (relative to a base quarter
of Q1 2008). Starting in Q4 2012, the first full quarter in the IPR
period, all quarterly fixed effects are positive and significant (at
least at the 10 percent level). The magnitudes and significance
of the coefficients increase notably in Q2 2013.
Taken together, the results of these models support the
visual observations from Figure 4. We do not see evidence that
the switch to IPR resulted in an immediate, discontinuous jump
to a higher rate of challenges. Rather, we see support for a policy
change that was either gradual or had a delayed effect. In the
narrow windows right around the policy change, we see little
discernable difference in the challenge rate. In the subsequent
progression of months, however, we see that the use of
challenges is increasing more quickly than the pre-policy trend.
We suggest two possible explanations for the timing of this
effect. First, there are two reasons to believe that the effect of
the policy indicator is clouded in the period surrounding the
actual policy change. First, as noted earlier in this Section, while
September 16th, 2012 was the first date on which a defendant
would have IPR available the instant they are sued, defendants
who were sued in the year prior to this date in theory could still
request an IPR when it became available. Therefore, cases in the
last few quarters of what we have coded as the IPX period can
be linked to IPR, rather than IPX, challenges. Further, since
parties were on notice for a full year that the change from IPX
to IPR was coming, there might have been selection around the
policy change. Certain plaintiffs may have timed their lawsuits,
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for example, to fall before or after the policy change. Lastly, one
of the AIA policy changes (the change in the denials standard)
took effect a year before the switch to IPR, and thus a portion of
the overall policy effect was already in place in the year prior to
the IPR period.196 Taken together, these factors might partially
explain the lack of significance in the narrowest window in Table
A4.
More broadly, defendants may have been hesitant to make
use of IPR right after it became available. Risk averse
defendants or their counsel may have preferred to observe the
first few outcomes of IPR before making use of this new tool.
Similarly, they may have preferred to observe whether certain
courts would be willing to grant stays before instituting an IPR
alongside their parallel litigation case. This could explain both a
gradual adoption of IPR, as well as a dichotomous jump several
periods after the policy change. The former would be consistent
with parties having different thresholds of comfort with IPR, and
the latter would be consistent with a tipping point where enough
information on the outcomes or court treatment of IPR for
parties broadly to respond to the policy change.
As discussed in Part II, the IPX regime differs from the IPR
regime in many ways.197 These changes were motivated at least
in part by a desire to make administrative challenges more
appealing to litigants.198 The data presented in this Part
suggests that this goal has been achieved. When subjected to
more rigorous analysis, the visual observation of increasing
filings post-AIA holds up to scrutiny. Despite an apparent
delayed or gradual effect, rates of administrative patent
challenges in the years following the switch to IPR ar higher for
patents litigated after to the AIA took effect, even when
controlling for a variety of other variables that predict these
challenges. To the extent that policymakers hoped that the AIA
would increase the use of administrative challenges, our results
provided some evidence that they have succeeded.

196. Supra Section II.C.
197. See Section II supra.
198. Id; See also Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9, at 65 (“In
general, the AIA’s legislative history indicates Congress wanted both IPRs and
CBM reviews to serve as a substitute for Article III litigation over patent
validity.”).
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VARIABLES
AIA

Table 10: AIA Effects
(1)
(2)
AIA Indicator Add Trend
0.075***
(0.007)

Constant
Patent Filing
Year FE
Patent Controls
District Court
FE
Judge FE
Time Trend

(3)
Add Controls

0.068***
(0.004)
N

0.034**
(0.017)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.073***
(0.009)
N

0.040**
(0.018)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.009
(0.053)
Y

N
Y

N
Y

Y
Y

N
N

N
Y

Y
Y

AIA*Trend
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Observations
34,129
34,129
33,095
R-squared
0.034
0.037
0.126
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases
are those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or
IPR occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are
those that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR
within 18 months). The “AIA” variable is an indicator that takes
the value “1” if the patent case was filed after 9/16/2012, and “0”
otherwise. Columns (2)–(3) include a linear time trend based on
filing dates, in days and centered around 9/16/2012, as well as
an “AIA*trend” variable that interacts this trend and the “AIA”
indicator. Columns (3) includes the full set of controls from
Column 4 of Table 9, excluding quarterly FE. All models are
linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by district
court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
B. THE AIA AND THE TYPES OF CHALLENGES
A more interesting question for policymakers is whether the
AIA increased the use of administrative procedures evenly
across the board, or if it instead made these challenges more
attractive for certain types of patents. That is, the effects of
patent-level variables may be different within the IPR regime
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compared to the IPX regime. Characteristics that predict
administrative challenge overall may be better or worse
predictors within the IPR or IPX regimes. This could suggest
that the AIA’s changes to these procedures changed the type of
patents that were selected into IPR versus IPX.
To investigate these effects, Table A6 reproduces the main
model from Table 9, run separately on the subsamples before
and after the policy change. We observe that several variables
that are statistically significant predictors of challenges in the
IPX period are not significant predictors of challenges in the IPR
period, and vice versa. Indeed, the only variable that is
significant at the 5 percent level in both subsamples is
prosecution time, which is negatively related to the odds of
challenge.
There is some evidence that patent scope, via the minimum
word count measure, matters within the IPX period (in the
direction of broader patents being more likely to be challenged),
but the same effect is not significant within the IPR period. The
same is true of mechanical patents, which are less likely than
other patents to be challenged in the IPX regime. On the other
side of the coin, computer & communication and electrical and
electronic patents are significantly more likely to be challenged,
but only in the IPR regime.
Importantly, the small entity effect—that small entity
patents are less likely to be challenged administratively—is only
significant in the IPR subsample. As one possible explanation,
we consider the changes in the cost structure from IPX to IPR.
The IPR process involves significant discovery and other triallike expenses. To the extent that small entities might settle early
to avoid the costs of administrative challenge, where they face
poor outcomes, this effect might be more pronounced in IPR if it
is relatively more costly overall. We note further that the PAE
indicator, which retains its negative sign and strong significance
in the IPR period model, is only marginally significant in the IPX
period model (at the 10 percent level), which could indicate the
PAE effect is driven primarily by the IPR period.
Taken together, these results suggest that the AIA may
have altered the selection of patents into administrative
challenge. To the extent that policymakers did not intend to
change the composition of patents that are administratively
challenged in this way, they should carefully investigate the
mechanisms that led to this change.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The use of administrative validity challenges, while still low
relative to litigation, increased significantly in the years after
the AIA took effect. Use of these procedures by district court
litigants may have significant private benefits in the form of
reduced cost and increased speed.199 Likewise, these procedures
promise substantial public benefits by fixing patent office errors,
and increasing the quality of granted patents.200 If policymakers
seek to increase the use of administrative patent challenges or
to evaluate their effects, they must first understand how they
are currently used.
Other literature has well established that certain intrinsic
and acquired characteristics of patents can predict litigation.201
Because the vast majority of administrative challenges occur
alongside litigation, it would not be surprising to find that these
same characteristics predict administrative challenges
compared to the overall pool of patents.202 Instead, we show that
intrinsic and acquired characteristics are good predictors of
administrative challenge even within the pool of already litigated
patents.203 Compared to other litigated patents, litigated patents
that are associated with an administrative challenge may be of
even higher value (when considering only non-challenged
litigated patents that are not settled early), are less likely to
have been issued to small entities or held by PAEs, and are more
likely to be computer or electronic patents and less likely to be
drug patents.204 And finally, we confirm, quantitatively, the
obvious visual observation: litigated patents are more likely to
be challenged at the patent office after the AIA, and the switch
to IPR, than before.205 But, the full story is more nuanced than
an across-the-board increase: selection patterns appear to have
changed in meaningful and heterogeneous ways.206

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Section I supra.
Id.
See Chien, supra note 29.
See Section IV. See also Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 9.
See Section VI supra.
See Section VII supra.
Id.
Id.
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Table A1: Comparing Litigation, IPX, and IPR207
Litigation
IPX
IPR
In Force
Entire
11/29/1999–
9/16/2012–
Period
9/15/2012
present
Venue
Various
USPTO
USPTO PTAB
District
Courts
Who
District
Patent
Administrative
Decides?
Court
Examiners
Patent Judges
Judges or
Juries
Standard to Iqbal /
Substantial
Reasonable
Institute
Twombly
New Question
Likelihood of
Review
to
of Patentability Prevailing on
Overcome (preat Least one
Motion to
9/16/2011);
Claim
Dismiss
Reasonable
Likelihood of
Prevailing on
at Least One
Claim
(9/16/2011-end)
When Can a Anytime
Anytime
≥9 months
Patent be
post-issuance,
Challenged?
and ≤1 year
post-litigation
Restrictions None
Only patents
None
On patent
filed After Nov.
Filing Date?
1999
Presumption Yes
No
No
of validity?

207. The material in this table is cited appropriately when it is first
presented. For clarity of the table, we do not include supra citations to each
source again. This table was constructed by the authors. Still, it was inspired
by similar tables constructed by other sources to compare these or different
procedures. See PX vs. IPR—A Cheat Sheet, supra note 82 (providing a
comparison of inter partes reexamination and inter partes review); See also
Reexamination and its Interplay with Litigation, DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP
(March
2011),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160812134841/http://www.ryuka.com/home/uplo
ads/pdf/Reexam_presentation.pdf (summarizing the procedural aspects of
reexamination and a providing context and comparison to litigation and IPR
procedures for invalidation).
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Standard to
prove
invalidity
Permissible
invalidity
grounds

Clear and
convincing
evidence
Any

Formal
settlement
possible?
Appeals?

Yes

Estoppel

Usual
Civil
Litigation
Estoppel
High
Lengthy

Cost
Time to
decision on
the merits

Federal
Circuit

208. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100.
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Preponderance
of the evidence

Preponderance
of the evidence

Novelty and
nonobviousnes
s on printed
publications
only
No

Novelty and
nonobviousnes
s on printed
publications
only
Yes

Board of
Patent Appeals
and
Interferences;
Federal Circuit
Binds after
appeals

PTAB; Federal
Circuit

Low
Lengthy

Medium
1.5 years by
statute (2
years in
exceptional
cases)208

Binds before
appeals
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Table A2: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge
Using Patent Classes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
VARIABLES
Intrinsic Add
Add Small
Add
Patent
Acquired Entity and
Judges
Characte Characte PAE
ristics
ristics

Independent
claims

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

(0.001)
-0.004

(0.001)
-0.005

(0.001)
-0.005

(0.001)
-0.006***

(0.003)
Back citations per 0.001*
claim
(0.001)
Prosecution per
-0.011*
claim (years)
(0.006)
Age (years)

(0.003)
0.001*

(0.003)
0.001

(0.002)
0.001

Min. word in ind.
Claims/100

Forward Citations
per year per claim
Assigned

(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.017*** -0.016***

(0.001)
-0.018***

(0.006)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.008

(0.006)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.007

(0.006)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.006

(0.005)
0.003
(0.007)

(0.005)
0.012
(0.007)
-0.028***

(0.005)
0.011
(0.007)
-0.024**

(0.009)
-0.039***
(0.008)
0.016
(0.050)
Y

(0.010)
-0.037***
(0.010)
0.019
(0.051)
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Small entity
indicator
PAE
Constant
Patent Filing
Year FE
Patent Class FE
District Court FE

-0.049**
(0.020)
Y
Y
Y

-0.001
(0.050)
Y
Y
Y
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Litigation
Quarter FE
Judge FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

Observations
33,435
33,435
33,435
33,069
R-squared
0.092
0.092
0.095
0.164
Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those
that could not be matched (i.e. had no such IPX or IPR within 18
months). All models are linear probability models. Standard
errors, clustered by district court and patent, in parenthesis; *,
**, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Table A3: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge:
Excluding Non-Challenged Cases that Terminated Early
VARIABLES

Independent
claims

(1)
Intrinsic
Patent
Characte
ristics

(2)
Add
Acquired
Characte
ristics

(3)
Add
Small
Entity
and PAE

(4)
Add
Judges

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.001)
-0.007

(0.001)
-0.007

(0.001)
-0.008

(0.007)
0.002**

(0.007)
0.002**

(0.006)
0.002**

(0.001)
-0.054***

(0.001)
-0.054***

(0.001)
-0.056***

(0.011)
-0.060**
(0.030)
0.023

(0.012)
-0.059*
(0.030)
0.023

(0.013)
-0.065**
(0.029)
0.030

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.001)
Min. word in ind. -0.006
Claims/100
(0.007)
Back citations per 0.002**
claim
(0.001)
Prosecution
-0.037***
per claim (years)
(0.009)
Chemical
-0.060*
(0.031)
Computer &
0.034
Comm.
(0.022)
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Drug & Medical
Electrical &
Electronic
Mechanical

-0.097*** -0.101***
(0.032)
(0.032)
0.066**
0.062**

-0.099*** -0.109***
(0.030)
(0.034)
0.063**
0.067**

(0.030)
-0.066**
(0.025)

(0.030)
-0.066**
(0.025)
-0.005***
(0.002)
0.024**

(0.031)
-0.066***
(0.025)
-0.005***
(0.002)
0.025**

(0.030)
-0.062**
(0.028)
-0.005***
(0.002)
0.025**

(0.011)
0.037***
(0.012)

(0.011)
0.036***
(0.013)
0.009

(0.011)
0.027**
(0.013)
0.004

(0.016)
0.005
(0.011)
-0.027
(0.065)
Y

(0.017)
0.002
(0.013)
0.001
(0.068)
Y

Age (years)
Forward Citations
per year per claim
Assigned
Small entity
indicator
PAE
Constant
Patent Filing Year
FE
District Court FE
Litigation Quarter
FE
Judge FE
Observations
R-squared
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-0.101*** -0.024
(0.037)
(0.066)
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

N

N

N

Y

15,769
0.116

15,769
0.119

15,769
0.119

15,507
0.234

Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those
that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within
18 months) and did not terminate before on year. All models are
linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by district
court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table A4: AIA Effects Robustness Checks
(1)
Class

Variables

AIA

0.042**
(0.017)

AIA*Trend

(2)
Modified
Nonchallenged
0.055*
(0.030)

(3)
540
Days

(4)
360
Days

(5)
180
Days

-0.000

0.018

0.024

(0.023)

(0.024)

(0.019)

0.000*** 0.000***

0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.033

0.034

0.021

-0.061

0.051

(0.049)

(0.063)

(0.092)

(0.111)

(0.134)

Patent Class
FE

Y

N

N

N

N

Observations

33,069

15,507

15,772

10,830

5,593

R-squared

0.162

0.229

0.181

0.230

0.260

Constant

Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those
that could not be matched (i.e. had no such IPX or IPR within 18
months), except for Column 2 which follows Table A3 and
excludes non-challenged cases that terminated within one year.
The “AIA” variable is an indicator that takes the value “1” if the
patent case was filed after 9/16/2012, and “0” otherwise. All
columns include a linear time trend based on filing dates, in days
and centered around 9/16/2012, as well as an “AIA*trend”
variable that interacts this trend and the “AIA” indicator. All
columns also include the full set of controls and fixed effects from
Column 4 of Table 9, excluding the quarterly FE. Column (1)
replaces the NBER categories with a full set of patent classes..
Columns (3)–(5) restrict the sample to 540, 360, and 180 days on
either side of 9/16/12 (total widths of three years, two years, and
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one year respectively). All models are linear probability models.
Standard errors, clustered by district court and patent, in
parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively.
Table A5: AIA Effects Robustness Checks
VARIABLES
Q2 2008
Q3 2008
Q4 2008
Q1 2009
Q2 2009
Q3 2009
Q4 2009
Q1 2010
Q2 2010
Q3 2010
Q4 2010
Q1 2011
Q2 2011
Q3 2011
Q4 2011
Q1 2012
Q2 2012

(1)
Quarters
0.033
(0.029)
0.031
(0.037)
-0.013
(0.016)
-0.016
(0.018)
0.018
(0.018)
0.017
(0.023)
0.032
(0.021)
-0.008
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.019)
0.035*
(0.019)
0.000
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.018)
0.015
(0.020)
0.028*
(0.015)
0.038*
(0.020)
0.024
(0.021)
0.008

(2)
Add Controls
0.032
(0.037)
0.027
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.025)
-0.003
(0.023)
0.032
(0.022)
0.020
(0.030)
0.037
(0.029)
-0.003
(0.024)
0.002
(0.028)
0.039
(0.024)
0.003
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.024)
0.015
(0.023)
0.043
(0.026)
0.044
(0.031)
0.027
(0.025)
0.018
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Q3 2012
Q4 2012
Q1 2013
Q2 2013
Q3 2013
Q4 2013
Q1 2014
Q2 2014
Q3 2014
Q4 2014
Q1 2015
Q2 2015
Q3 2015
Q4 2015
Constant
Patent Filing Year FE
Patent Controls
District Court FE
Judge FE
Observations
R-squared

(0.013)
0.028
(0.022)
0.023*
(0.013)
0.030*
(0.017)
0.078***
(0.022)
0.085***
(0.029)
0.115***
(0.017)
0.115***
(0.031)
0.107***
(0.022)
0.096***
(0.027)
0.107***
(0.028)
0.100***
(0.022)
0.108***
(0.018)
0.124***
(0.022)
0.090***
(0.020)
0.055***
(0.014)
N
N
Y
N
34,129
0.040
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(0.017)
0.029
(0.028)
0.043*
(0.023)
0.045*
(0.024)
0.091***
(0.027)
0.089***
(0.027)
0.122***
(0.023)
0.126***
(0.035)
0.109***
(0.023)
0.108***
(0.030)
0.117***
(0.036)
0.117***
(0.035)
0.117***
(0.029)
0.121***
(0.029)
0.102***
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.053)
Y
Y
Y
Y
33,095
0.128

Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR
occurring within 18 months. The models include quarter
dummies, the first full quarter in IPR is Q4 2012. Column (2)
includes the full set of controls from Column 4 of Table 9. The
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models are linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered
by district court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table A6: Patent Determinants of Administrative Challenge:
Before and After AIA
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
Independent claims
Min. word in ind.
Claims/100
Back citations per claim
Prosecution per claim
(years)
Chemical
Computer & Comm.
Drug & Medical
Electrical & Electronic
Mechanical
Age (years)
Forward Citations per year
per claim
Assigned
Small entity indicator

IPX Period

IPR Period

0.001
(0.001)
-0.006**

0.001
(0.001)
-0.005

(0.003)
0.001*
(0.001)
-0.022***

(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.032***

(0.008)
0.001
(0.016)
0.006
(0.014)
-0.022
(0.016)
-0.004
(0.014)
-0.030**
(0.013)
-0.006*
(0.003)
0.014*

(0.009)
-0.028
(0.031)
0.051***
(0.017)
-0.045
(0.034)
0.088***
(0.030)
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.009

(0.008)
0.002
(0.006)
0.002
(0.010)

(0.006)
0.017
(0.014)
-0.034**
(0.016)
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PAE

Patent Filing Year FE
District Court FE
Litigation Quarter FE
Judge FE

-0.016*
(0.009)
0.058**
(0.028)
Y
Y
Y
Y

-0.053***
(0.015)
0.027
(0.091)
Y
Y
Y
Y

Observations
R-squared

13,596
0.152

19,390
0.154

Constant
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Notes: Dependent variable is “challenged”; challenged cases are
those where the litigated patent was matched to an IPX or IPR
occurring within 18 months. “Non-challenged” cases are those
that could not be matched (i.e., had no such IPX or IPR within
18 months). Column (2) covers cases filed on or after 9/16/2012,
and Column (1) covers the remainder of our sample. All models
are linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by
district court and patent, in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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